The courage which at present animates our forces, arises, my lords, from a very proper ground, their former victories over the enemies which they are now to combat, and will, therefore, doubtless, continue while they can consider themselves as enjoying the same advantage with those particular men by whom the victories were obtained.  But, my lords, if any essential part of their establishment be changed, they will be considered, both by themselves and their enemies, as a different army; they will then charge with less alacrity, and be opposed with less dejection; they will consider themselves as fighting without that certainty of success which arises from experience, and their enemies will resolve to try, by an obstinate resistance, whether they are now equally formidable as in their former state.

Thus, my lords, I have attempted, however weakly, to represent the arguments which I have heard for the continuance of the establishment, of which your lordships will examine the validity, and shall now proceed to consider the noble duke’s system of a military subordination in time of peace.

Whether a standing army in time of peace is made necessary to the change of conduct in foreign courts, it is now useless to inquire; but it will be easily granted by your lordships, that no motive but necessity, necessity absolute and inevitable, ought to influence us to support a standing body of regular forces, which have always been accounted dangerous, and generally found destructive to a free people.

The chief reason, my lords, of the danger arising from a standing army, may be ascribed to the circumstances by which men, subject to military laws, are distinguished from other members of the same community; they are, by the nature of martial government, exposed to punishment which other men never incur, and tried by forms of a different and more rigorous kind than those which are practised by the civil power.  They are, if not exempted from the jurisdiction of a magistrate, yet subject to another authority which they see more frequently and more severely exerted, and which, therefore, they fear and reverence in a higher degree.  They, by entering into the army, lay aside, for the most part, all prospect of advantage from commerce or civil employments, and, in a few years, neither fear nor hope any thing but from the favour or displeasure of their own officers.

For these, my lords, or for other reasons, the soldiers have always been inclined to consider themselves as a body distinct from the rest of the community, and independent on it, a government regulated by their own laws, without regard to the general constitution of their country; they have, therefore, been ready to subvert the constitution, from which they received little advantage, and to oppress the civil magistrates, for whom they had lost their reverence.