That where this maxim is not allowed and adhered to, rights and liberties are empty sounds, is uncontestably evident; if this principle be forsaken, guilt and innocence are equally secure, all caution is vain, and all testimony useless.  Caprice will, in our courts, supply the place of reason, and all evidence must give way to malice, or to favour.

I hope, therefore, my lords, that your regard to justice, to truth, and to your own safety, will influence you to confirm this great and self-evident principle by a standing resolution, that may not only restrain oppression in the present age, but direct the judiciary proceedings of our successors.

Lord LOVEL rose next, and spoke as follows:—­My lords, liberty and justice must always support each other, they can never long flourish apart; every temporary expedient that can be contrived to preserve or enlarge liberty by means arbitrary and oppressive, forms a precedent which may, in time, be made use of to violate or destroy it.  Liberty is in effect suspended whenever injustice is practised; for what is liberty, my lords, but the power of doing right without fear, without control, and without danger.

But, my lords, if any man may be condemned unheard, if judgment may precede evidence, what safety or what confidence can integrity afford?  It is in vain that any man means well, and acts prudently; it is even in vain that he can prove the justice and prudence of his conduct.

By liberty, my lords, can never be meant the privilege of doing wrong without being accountable, because liberty is always spoken of as happiness, or one of the means to happiness, and happiness and virtue cannot be separated.  The great use of liberty must, therefore, be to preserve justice from violation; justice, the great publick virtue, by which a kind of equality is diffused over the whole society, by which wealth is restrained from oppression, and inferiority preserved from servitude.

Liberty, general liberty, must imply general justice; for wherever any part of a state can be unjust with impunity, the rest are slaves.  That to condemn any man unheard is oppressive and unjust, is beyond controversy demonstrable, and that no such power is claimed by your lordships will, I hope, appear from your resolutions.

Lord GOWER spoke next:—­My lords, to the principle laid down by those noble lords, I have no objection, and concur with them in hoping that all our proceedings will contribute to establish it; but why it should be confirmed by a formal resolution, why the house should solemnly declare their assent to a maxim which it would be madness to deny, it is beyond my penetration to discover.

Though the noble lord’s position cannot be controverted, yet his motion, if it is designed to imply any censure of the proceedings of this day, may reasonably be rejected, and that some censure is intended we may conjecture, because no other reason can be given why it was not made at some other time.