That no such stipulations were made by that treaty, that no injury was intended to our commerce, nor any invasion proposed in favour of the pretender, are very bold assertions, and though they could be supported by all the evidence that negatives admit of, yet will not easily be believed by your lordships, in opposition to the solemn assurances of his late majesty.  It is evident, from this instance, how much prejudice prevails over argument; they are ready to condemn the right honourable gentleman to whom they give the title of sole minister, upon the suffrage of common fame, yet will not acquit him upon the testimony of the king himself.

But, my lords, the arguments alleged to prove the improbability of such a confederacy, are so weak in themselves, that they require no such illustrious evidence to overbalance them.  For upon what are they founded, but upon the impossibility of executing such designs?

It is well known, my lords, how differently different parties consider the same cause, the same designs, and the same state of affairs.  Every man is partial in favour of his own equity, strength, and sagacity.  Who can show that the same false opinion of their own power, and of our intestine divisions, which now prompts the Spaniards to contend with us, might not then incite them to invade us, or at least to countenance the attempts of one, whom they are industriously taught to believe the greatest part of the nation is ready to receive?

That they might have injured our trade is too evident from our present experience, and that they would have supported the Ostend company, which they espoused in an open manner, is undeniable.  Nor is it in the least unlikely, that, elated with the certain power of doing much mischief, and with the imaginary prospects of far greater effects, they might engage in a confederacy, and farther attempts against us.

I am far from imagining, my lords, that it was in the power of the Germans and Spaniards united to force the pretender upon us, though we had stood alone against them; but the impossibility of succeeding in their design was not then so apparent to them as it is at present to us; they had many reasons to wish, and therefore would not be long without some to believe it practicable; and it was not the danger but the insult that determined his late majesty to enter into an alliance with France.

War, my lords, is always to be avoided, if the possessions and reputation of a people can be preserved without it; it was, therefore, more eligible to oblige them to lay aside their scheme while it was yet only in idea, than to defeat it in its execution.  And an alliance with France effectually restrained the emperour, as our fleets in America reduced the Spaniards to desire peace.

Why we did not seize the cargo of the galleons, has been often asked, and as often such answers have been returned as ought to satisfy any rational examiner.  We did not seize them, my lords, because a larger part belonged to other nations than to the Spaniards, and because the interests of our trade made it convenient not to exasperate the Spaniards, so far as to render a reconciliation very difficult.