Those who suffer their minds to dwell on these considerations, will think it no great crime in the ministry, that they have not snatched, with eagerness, the first opportunity of rushing into the field, when they were able to obtain, by quiet negotiation, all the real good that victory could have brought us.

Of victory, indeed, every nation is confident before the sword is drawn; and this mutual confidence produces that wantonness of bloodshed, that has so often desolated the world.  But it is evident, that of contradictory opinions, one must be wrong; and the history of mankind does not want examples, that may teach caution to the daring, and moderation to the proud.

Let us not think our laurels blasted by condescending to inquire, whether we might not possibly grow rather less than greater by attacking Spain.  Whether we should have to contend with Spain alone, whatever has been promised by our patriots, may very reasonably be doubted.  A war declared for the empty sound of an ancient title to a Magellanick rock, would raise the indignation of the earth against us.  These encroachers on the waste of nature, says our ally the Russian, if they succeed in their first effort of usurpation, will make war upon us for a title to Kamtschatka.  These universal settlers, says our ally the Dane, will, in a short time, settle upon Greenland, and a fleet will batter Copenhagen, till we are willing to confess, that it always was their own.

In a quarrel, like this, it is not possible that any power should favour us, and it is very likely that some would oppose us.  The French, we are told, are otherwise employed:  the contests between the king of France, and his own subjects, are sufficient to withhold him from supporting Spain.  But who does not know that a foreign war has often put a stop to civil discords?  It withdraws the attention of the publick from domestick grievances, and affords opportunities of dismissing the turbulent and restless to distant employments.  The Spaniards have always an argument of irresistible persuasion:  if France will not support them against England, they will strengthen England against France.

But let us indulge a dream of idle speculation, and suppose that we are to engage with Spain, and with Spain alone; it is not even yet very certain that much advantage will be gained.  Spain is not easily vulnerable; her kingdom, by the loss or cession of many fragments of dominion, is become solid and compact.  The Spaniards have, indeed, no fleet able to oppose us, but they will not endeavour actual opposition:  they will shut themselves up in their own territories, and let us exhaust our seamen in a hopeless siege:  they will give commissions to privateers of every nation, who will prey upon our merchants without possibility of reprisal.  If they think their Plata fleet in danger, they will forbid it to set sail, and live awhile upon the credit of treasure which all Europe knows to be safe; and which, if our obstinacy should continue till they can no longer be without it, will be conveyed to them with secrecy and security, by our natural enemies the French, or by the Dutch our natural allies.