of a separate state, was shaped by serious causes, and did good service in the political history of the Russian Empire.  One is hardly justified, therefore, in blaming this work of Alexander I., as is now so often done....  The annexation of Finland, poor by nature and at that time utterly ruined by protracted wars, was of moment to Russia, not so much from an economic or financial as from a strategical point of view.  And what in those days was important was not its Russification, but solely the military position which it afforded.  Besides, the incorporation of Finland took place at a calamitous juncture—­for Russia.  On the political horizon of Europe the clouds were growing denser and blacker, and there was a general foreboding of the coming events of the year 1812.  If, at that time, Czar Alexander I. had applied to Finland the methods of administration which are wont to be employed in conquered countries, Finland would have become a millstone round Russia’s neck during the critical period of her struggle with Napoleon, which demanded the utmost tension of our national forces.  Fear of insurrections and risings would have compelled Russia to maintain a large army there and to spend considerable sums in administering the country.  But Alexander I. struck out a different course.  His Majesty recognized the necessity of “bestowing upon the people, by means of internal organization, incomparably more advantages than it had had under the sway of Sweden.”  And the Emperor held that an effective means of achieving this would be to give the nation such a status “that it should be accounted not enthralled by Russia, but attached to her in virtue of its own manifest interests.”  “This valiant and trusty people,” said Czar Alexander I., when winding up the Diet of Borgo, “will bless Providence for establishing the present order of things.  And I shall garner in the best fruits of my solicitude when I shall see this people tranquil from without, free within, devoting itself to agriculture and industry under the protection of the laws and their own good conduct, and by its very prosperity rendering justice in my intentions and blessing its destiny.”

Subsequent history justified the rosiest hopes of the Emperor.  The immediate consequence of the policy he adopted toward Finland was that the country quickly became calmed and settled after the fierce war that had been waged there, and that in this way Russia was enabled to concentrate all her forces upon the contest with Napoleon.  According to the words of Alexander I. himself, the annexation of Finland “was of the greatest advantage to Russia; without it, in 1812, we might not, perhaps, have won success, because Napoleon had in Bernadotte his steward, who, being within five days’ march of our capital, would have been inevitably compelled to join his forces with those of Napoleon.  Bernadotte himself told me so several times, and added that he had Napoleon’s order to declare war against Russia.”  And afterward, during almost a century, Finland never occasioned any worries, political or economic, to the Russian Government, and did not require special sacrifices or special solicitude on its part.