It was in his relations with Roumania that Daneff’s diplomacy was most stupid.  M. Take Jonescu, one of Roumanians ablest statesmen, was sent by the Government to the first Peace Conference at London to secure pledges from Dr. Daneff in regard to the Roumanian demand.  He could get no answer.  Daneff used every device to gain time in the hope that a settlement with Turkey would relieve Bulgaria from the necessity of giving anything.  When the peace negotiations failed and the war between the allies and Turkey recommenced, the relations between Roumania and Bulgaria became very critical.  However, at the Czar’s suggestion, both countries agreed to refer the dispute to a conference of the ambassadors of the great Powers at St. Petersburg.  Dr. Daneff, who represented Bulgaria, adopted a most truculent attitude and refused to yield on any point.  As a result of the skilful diplomacy of the French ambassador, M. Delcasse, in reconciling the divergent views of the great Powers, Roumania was awarded, on April 19th, the town of Silistria and a three-mile zone around it, but was refused an increase on the seaboard.  The award was very unpopular in Roumania, but M. Jonescu risked his official life by successfully urging the Roumanian Government to accept it.  But when it became perfectly evident, after the signing of the Treaty of London on May 30th, that the former allies were now to be enemies, the Roumanian government notified Bulgaria that she could not rely upon its neutrality without compensation in the interests of the equilibrium of the Balkans.

Such was the diplomatic situation when the Czar’s telegram of June 11th was received by King Ferdinand.  Nothing could have been more inopportune for the Bulgarian cause.  Though the government had no intention of changing its plan, sufficient deference had to be paid to the Czar’s request to suspend the forward movement of troops.  The delay was fatal.  The Servians, who were already aware that the Bulgarians were in motion, now learned their direction and their actual positions.  The Servian Government hastened to fortify the passes of the Balkans between Bulgaria and the home territory, and the Servian army in Macedonia effected a junction with the Greek army from Salonika.  There was nothing left for the Bulgarians but to direct their offensive movements against the southern Servian divisions in Macedonia.  The great coup had failed.  Instead of attacking first the Servians and then the Greeks and overwhelming them separately, it was necessary to fight their combined forces.

Every element in the situation demanded the utmost caution on the part of Bulgaria.  Elementary prudence dictated that she yield to Roumanians demand for a slice of the seaboard to Baltchik in order to prevent Roumania from joining Servia and Greece.  No doubt, had Daneff yielded he would have been voted out of office by the opposition, for the military party was in the ascendant at Sofia also.  But a real statesman