For reasons that were never quite fathomed by Madero’s Government, Huerta took his time about obeying these orders.  Thus, he lingered first at Ciudad Juarez, then at Chihuahua City, then at Santa Rosalia, next at Jimenez, and presently at Torreon, where he remained for over a week, apparently sulking in his tent like Achilles.  This gave rise to grave suspicions, and rumors flew all over Mexico that Huerta was about to make common cause with Orozco.  President Madero himself, at this time, told a friend of mine that he was afraid Huerta was going to turn traitor.  About the same time, at a diplomatic reception, President Madero stated openly to Ambassador Wilson that he had reasons to suspect Huerta’s loyalty.  At length, however, General Huerta appeared at the capital, and after a somewhat chilly interview with the President, obtained a suspension from duty so that he might have his eyes treated by a specialist.

Thus it happened that Huerta, who was nearly blind then, escaped being drawn into the sudden military movements that grew out of General Felix Diaz’s unexpected revolt and temporary capture of the port of Vera Cruz last October.

General Huerta’s part in Felix Diaz’s second revolution, four months later, is almost too recent to have been forgotten.  He was the senior ranking general at the capital when the rebellion broke out, and was summoned to his post of duty by President Madero from the very first.  He accompanied Madero in his celebrated ride from Chapultepec Castle to the National Palace on the morning of the first day of the famous “Ten Days,” and was put in supreme command of the forces of the Government after the first hurried council of war.  President Madero, totally lacking in military professional knowledge as he was, confided the entire conduct of the necessary war measures to General Huerta; but it soon became apparent that the old General either could not or would not direct any energetic offensive movement against the rebels.  From the very first the Government committed the fatal blunder of letting the rebels slowly proceed to the Citadel—­a fortified military arsenal—­the retention of which was of paramount importance, without even attempting to intercept their roundabout march or to frustrate their belated entry into the poorly guarded Citadel.  Later, when it became clear that the rebels could not be dislodged from this stronghold by street rushes, no attempt was made to shell them out of their strong position by a high-angle bombardment of plunging explosive shells.

After it was all over General Huerta explained the ill-success of his military measures during the ten days’ street-fighting by saying that President Madero was a madman who had spoiled all Huerta’s military plans and measures by utterly impracticable counter-orders.  At the time, though, it was given out officially that Huerta had been placed in absolute, unrestricted command.  When the American Ambassador, toward the close of the long bombardment, appealed