later.  I have written in vain if I have not convinced the reader that the European anarchy inevitably provokes that state of mind in the Powers, and that they all live constantly under the threat of war.  To understand the action of those who had power in Germany during the critical days it is necessary to bear in mind all that I have brought into relief in the preceding pages:  the general situation, which grouped the Powers of the Entente against those of the Triple Alliance; the armaments and counter-armaments; the colonial and economic rivalry; the racial and national problems in South-East Europe; and the long series of previous crises, in each case tided over, but leaving behind, every one of them, a legacy of fresh mistrust and fear, which made every new crisis worse than the one before.  I do not palliate the responsibility of Germany for the outbreak of war.  But that responsibility is embedded in and conditioned by a responsibility deeper and more general—­the responsibility of all the Powers alike for the European anarchy.

If I have convinced the reader of this he will, I think, feel no difficulty in following me to a further conclusion.  Since the causes of this war, and of all wars, lie so deep in the whole international system, they cannot be permanently removed by the “punishment” or the “crushing” or any other drastic treatment of any Power, let that Power be as guilty as you please.  Whatever be the issue of this war, one thing is certain:  it will bring no lasting peace to Europe unless it brings a radical change both in the spirit and in the organization of international politics.

What that change must be may be deduced from the foregoing discussion of the causes of the war.  The war arose from the rivalry of States in the pursuit of power and wealth.  This is universally admitted.  Whatever be the diversities of opinion that prevail in the different countries concerned, nobody pretends that the war arose out of any need of civilization, out of any generous impulse or noble ambition.  It arose, according to the popular view in England, solely and exclusively out of the ambition of Germany to seize territory and power.  It arose, according to the popular German view, out of the ambition of England to attack and destroy the rising power and wealth of Germany.  Thus to each set of belligerents the war appears as one forced upon them by sheer wickedness, and from neither point of view has it any kind of moral justification.  These views, it is true, are both too simple for the facts.  But the account given in the preceding pages, imperfect as it is, shows clearly, what further knowledge will only make more explicit, that the war proceeded out of rivalry for empire between all the Great Powers in every part of the world.  The contention between France and Germany for the control of Morocco, the contention between Russia and Austria for the control of the Balkans, the contention between Germany and the other Powers for the control of Turkey—­these were