It will be noticed that Baron Beyens supposes the Kaiser to have been in the hands of the soldiers as early as July 26th.  On the other hand, as late as August 5th Beyens believed that the German Foreign Office had been working throughout for peace.  Describing an interview he had had on that day with Herr Zimmermann, he writes:—­

From this interview I brought away the impression that Herr Zimmermann spoke to me with his customary sincerity, and that the Department for Foreign Affairs since the opening of the Austro-Serbian conflict had been on the side of a peaceful solution, and that it was not due to it that its views and counsels had not prevailed...  A superior power intervened to precipitate the march of events.  It was the ultimatum from Germany to Russia, sent to St. Petersburg at the very moment when the Vienna Cabinet was showing itself more disposed to conciliation, which let loose the war.[7]

Why was that ultimatum sent?  According to the German apologists, it was sent because Russia had mobilized on the German frontier at the critical moment, and so made war inevitable.  There is, indeed, no doubt that the tension was enormously increased throughout the critical days by mobilization and rumours of mobilization.  The danger was clearly pointed out as early as July 26th in a dispatch of the Austrian Ambassador at Petrograd to his Government:—­

As the result of reports about measures taken for mobilization of Russian troops, Count Pourtales [German Ambassador at Petrograd] has called the Russian Minister’s attention in the most serious manner to the fact that nowadays measures of mobilization would be a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure.  For in that event the purely military consideration of the question by the General Staffs would find expression, and if that button were once touched in Germany the situation would get out of control.[8]

On the other hand, it must be remembered that in 1909 Austria had mobilized against Serbia and Montenegro,[9] and in 1912-13 Russia and Austria had mobilized against one another without war ensuing in either case.  Moreover, in view of the slowness of Russian mobilization, it is difficult to believe that a day or two would make the difference between security and ruin to Germany.  However, it is possible that the Kaiser was so advised by his soldiers, and genuinely believed the country to be in danger.  We do not definitely know.  What we do know is, that it was the German ultimatum that precipitated the war.

We are informed, however, by Baron Beyens that even at the last moment the German Foreign Office made one more effort for peace:—­