application of the principle of equal commercial opportunity.  An agreement of 1909 between France and Germany, whereby both Powers were to share equally in contracts for public works, was found in practice not to work.  The Germans pressed for its application to the new railways projected in Morocco.  The French delayed, temporized, and postponed decision.[3] Meantime they were strengthening their position in Morocco.  The matter was brought to a head by the expedition to Fez.  Initiated on the plea of danger to the European residents at the capital (a plea which was disputed by the Germans and by many Frenchmen), it clearly heralded a definite final occupation of the country.  The patience of the Germans was exhausted, and the Kaiser made the coup of Agadir.  There followed the Mansion House speech of Mr. Lloyd George and the Franco-German agreement of November 1911, whereby Germany recognized a French protectorate in Morocco in return for concessions of territory in the French Congo.  These are the bare facts of the Moroccan episode.  Much, of course, is still unrevealed, particularly as to the motives and intentions of the Powers concerned.  Did Germany, for instance, intend to seize a share of Morocco when she sent the Panther to Agadir?  And was that the reason of the vigour of the British intervention?  Possibly, but by no means certainly; the evidence accessible is conflicting.  If Germany had that intention, she was frustrated by the solidarity shown between France and England, and the result was the final and definite absorption of Morocco in the French Empire, with the approval and active support of Great Britain, Germany being compensated by the cession of part of the French Congo.  Once more a difficult question had been settled by diplomacy, but only after it had twice brought Europe to the verge of war, and in such a way as to leave behind the bitterest feelings of anger and mistrust in all the parties concerned.

The facts thus briefly summarized here may be studied more at length, with the relevant documents, in Mr. Morel’s book “Morocco in Diplomacy.”  The reader will form his own opinion on the part played by the various Powers.  But I do not believe that any instructed and impartial student will accept what appears to be the current English view, that the action of Germany in this episode was a piece of sheer aggression without excuse, and that the other Powers were acting throughout justly, honestly, and straightforwardly.

The Morocco crisis, as we have already seen, produced in Germany a painful impression, and strengthened there the elements making for war.  Thus Baron Beyens writes:—­

  The Moroccan conflicts made many Germans hitherto pacific regard another
  war as a necessary evil.[4]

And again:—­