[Footnote 1:  “L’Allemagne avant la guerre,” p. 240.]

[Footnote 2:  It is characteristic of the way history is written in time of war that M. Yves Guyot, citing Giolitti’s statement, omits the references to Germany. See “Les causes et les consequences de la guerre,” p. 101.]

[Footnote 3:  “L’Allemagne avant la guerre,” pp. 248, 262.]

15. Morocco.

Let us turn now to the other storm-centre, Morocco.  The salient features here were, first, the treaty of 1880, to which all the Great Powers, including, of course, Germany, were parties, and which guaranteed to the signatories most-favoured-nation treatment; secondly, the interest of Great Britain to prevent a strong Power from establishing itself opposite Gibraltar and threatening British control over the Straits; thirdly, the interest of France to annex Morocco and knit it up with the North African Empire; fourthly, the new colonial and trading interests of Germany, which, as she had formally announced, could not leave her indifferent to any new dispositions of influence or territory in undeveloped countries.  For many years French ambitions in Morocco had been held in check by the British desire to maintain the status quo.  But the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 gave France a free hand there in return for the abandonment of French opposition to the British position in Egypt.  The Anglo-French treaty of 1904 affirmed, in the clauses made public, the independence and integrity of Morocco; but there were secret clauses looking to its partition.  By these the British interest in the Straits was guaranteed by an arrangement which gave to Spain the reversion of the coast opposite Gibraltar and a strip on the north-west coast, while leaving the rest of the country to fall to France.  Germany was not consulted while these arrangements were being made, and the secret clauses of the treaty were, of course, not communicated to her.  But it seems reasonable to suppose that they became known to, or at least were suspected by, the German Government shortly after they were adopted.[1] And probably it was this that led to the dramatic intervention of the Kaiser at Tangier,[2] when he announced that the independence of Morocco was under German protection.  The result was the Conference of Algeciras, at which the independence and integrity of Morocco was once more affirmed (the clauses looking to its partition being still kept secret by the three Powers privy to them), and equal commercial facilities were guaranteed to all the Powers.  Germany thereby obtained what she most wanted, what she had a right to by the treaty of 1880, and what otherwise might have been threatened by French occupation—­the maintenance of the open door.  But the French enterprise was not abandoned.  Disputes with the natives such as always occur, or are manufactured, in these cases, led to fresh military intervention.  At the same time, it was difficult to secure the practical