The bad part played by Austria throughout this crisis is indisputable.  But it must be observed that, by general admission, Germany throughout worked hand in hand with Sir Edward Grey to keep the peace of Europe, which, indeed, otherwise could not have been kept.  And nothing illustrates this better than that episode of 1913 which is sometimes taken to throw discredit upon Germany.  The episode was thus described by the Italian minister, Giolitti:  “On the 9th of August, 1913, about a year before the war broke out, I, being then absent from Rome, received from my colleague, San Giuliano, the following telegram:  ’Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention to act against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to apply the casus foederis of the Triple Alliance, which I consider inapplicable.  I intend to join forces with Germany to prevent any such action by Austria, but it will be necessary to say clearly that we do not consider such eventual action as defensive, and therefore do not believe that the casus foederis exists.  Please telegraph to Rome if you approve.’

“I replied that, ’if Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is evident that the casus foederis does not arise.  It is an action that she undertakes on her own account, since there is no question of defence, as no one thinks of attacking her.  It is necessary to make a declaration in this sense to Austria in the most formal way, and it is to be wished that German action may dissuade Austria from her most perilous adventure.’"[2]

Now this statement shows upon the face of it two things.  One, that Austria was prepared, by attacking Serbia, to unchain a European war; the other, that the Italian ministers joined with Germany to dissuade her.  They were successful.  Austria abandoned her project, and war was avoided.  The episode is as discreditable as you like to Austria.  But, on the face of it, how does it discredit Germany?  More, of course, may lie behind; but no evidence has been produced, so far as I am aware, to show that the Austrian project was approved or supported by her ally.

The Treaty of Bucharest, which concluded the second Balkan War, left all the parties concerned dissatisfied.  But, in particular, it left the situation between Austria and Serbia and between Austria and Russia more strained than ever.  It was this situation that was the proximate cause of the present war.  For, as we have seen, a quarrel between Austria and Russia over the Balkans must, given the system of alliances, unchain a European war.  For producing that situation Austria-Hungary was mainly responsible.  The part played by Germany was secondary, and throughout the Balkan wars German diplomacy was certainly working, with England, for peace.  “The diplomacy of the Wilhelmstrasse,” says Baron Beyens, “applied itself, above all, to calm the exasperation and the desire for intervention at the Ballplatz.”  “The Cabinet of Berlin did not follow that of Vienna in its tortuous policy of intrigues at Sofia and Bucharest.  As M. Zimmermann said to me at the time, the Imperial Government contented itself with maintaining its neutrality in relation to the Balkans, abstaining from any intervention, beyond advice, in the fury of their quarrels.  There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of this statement."[3]