Muenster’s opposition, however, was only the beginning.  As the days went on it became clear that the Kaiser himself had become actively opposed to the whole idea of arbitration, and was influencing Austria and Italy and Turkey in that sense.  The delegates of all the other countries were in favour of the very mild application of it which was under consideration.  So, however, be it noted, were all the delegates from Germany, except Count Muenster.  And even he was, by now, so far converted that when orders were received from Germany definitely to refuse co-operation, he postponed the critical sitting of the committee, and dispatched Professor Zorn to Berlin to lay the whole matter before the Chancellor.  Professor Zorn was accompanied by the American Dr. Holls, bearing an urgent private letter to Prince Hohenlohe from Mr. White.  The result was that the German attitude was changed, and the arbitration tribunal was finally established with the consent and co-operation of the German Government.

I have thought it worth while to dwell thus fully upon this episode because it illustrates how misleading it really is to talk of “Germany” and the “German” attitude.  There is every kind of German attitude.  The Kaiser is an unstable and changeable character.  His ministers do not necessarily agree with him, and he does not always get his way.  As a consequence of discussion and persuasion the German opposition, on this occasion, was overcome.  There was nothing, in fact, fixed and final about it.  It was the militarist prejudice, and the prejudice this time yielded to humanity and reason.

The subject was taken up again in the Conference of 1907, and once more Germany was in opposition.  The German delegate, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, while he was not against compulsory arbitration for certain selected topics, was opposed to any general treaty.  It seems clear that it was this attitude of Germany that prevented any advance being made beyond the Convention of 1899.  Good reasons, of course, could be given for this attitude; but they are the kind of reasons that goodwill could have surmounted.  It seems clear that there was goodwill in other Governments, but not in that of Germany, and the latter lies legitimately under the prejudice resulting from the position she then took.  German critics have recognized this as freely as critics of other countries.  I myself feel no desire to minimize the blame that attaches to Germany.  But Englishmen who criticize her policy must always ask themselves whether they would support a British Government that should stand for a general treaty of compulsory arbitration.

On the question of limitation of armaments the German Government has been equally intransigeant.  At the Conference of 1899, indeed, no serious effort was made by any Power to achieve the avowed purpose of the meeting.  And, clearly, if anything was intended to be done, the wrong direction was taken from the beginning.  When the second Conference was to meet it is understood that the German Government refused participation if the question of armaments was to be discussed, and the subject did not appear on the official programme.  Nevertheless the British, French, and American delegates took occasion to express a strong sense of the burden of armaments, and the urgent need of lessening it.