It is interesting to note, however, that the Pangerman propaganda purports to be based upon fear.  If they urge increased armaments, it is with a view to defence.  “I considered it a patriotic duty,” wrote General Keim, “in my quality of president of the German League for Defence, to demand an increase of effectives such that France should find it out of the question to dream of a victorious war against us, even with the help of other nations.”  “To the awakening of the national sentiment in France there is only one reply—­the increase of the German forces.”  “I have the impression,” said Count Reventlow, “that a warlike spirit which is new is developing in France.  There is the danger.”  Thus in Germany, as elsewhere, even jingoism took the mask of necessary precaution.  And so it must be, and will be everywhere, as long as the European anarchy continues.  For what nation has ever admitted an intention or desire to make aggressive war?  M. Bourdon, then, takes full account of Pangermanism.  Nor does he neglect the general militaristic tendencies of German opinion.  He found pride in the army, a determination to be strong, and that belief that it is in war that the State expresses itself at the highest and the best, which is part of the tradition of German education since the days of Treitschke.  Yet, in spite of all this, to which M. Bourdon does full justice, the general impression made by the conversations he records is that the bulk of opinion in Germany was strongly pacific.  There was apprehension indeed, apprehension of France and apprehension of England.  “England certainly preoccupies opinion more than France.  People are alarmed by her movements and her armaments.”  “The constant interventions of England have undoubtedly irritated the public.”  Germany, therefore, must arm and arm again.  “A great war may be delayed, but not prevented, unless German armaments are such as to put fear into the heart of every possible adversary.”

Germany feared that war might come, but she did not want it—­that, in sum, was M. Bourdon’s impression.  From soldiers, statesmen, professors, business men, again and again, the same assurance.  “The sentiment you will find most generally held is undoubtedly that of peace.”  “Few think about war.  We need peace too much.”  “War!  War between us!  What an idea!  Why, it would mean a European war, something monstrous, something which would surpass in horror anything the world has ever seen!  My dear sir, only madmen could desire or conceive such a calamity!  It must be avoided at all costs.”  “What counts above all here is commercial interest.  All who live by it are, here as elsewhere, almost too pacific.”  “Under the economic conditions prevailing in Germany, the most glorious victory she can aspire to—­it is a soldier who says it—­is peace!”

The impression thus gathered from M. Bourdon’s observations is confirmed at every point by those of Baron Beyens, who went to Berlin as Belgian minister after the crisis of Agadir.[2] Of the world of business he says:—­