in Germany. There is jingoism in all countries,
as there is pacifism in all countries. Nevertheless,
I think it is true to say that the jingoism of Germany
has been peculiar both in its intensity and in its
character. This special quality appears to be
due both to the temperament and to the recent history
of the German nation. The Germans are romantic,
as the French are impulsive, the English sentimental,
and the Russians religious. There is some real
meaning in these generalisations. They are easily
to be felt when one comes into contact with a nation,
though they may be hard to establish or define.
When I say that the Germans are romantic, I mean that
they do not easily or willingly see things as they
are. Their temperament is like a medium of coloured
glass. It magnifies, distorts, conceals, transmutes.
And this is as true when their intellectual attitude
is realistic as when it is idealistic. In the
Germany of the past, the Germany of small States,
to which all non-Germans look back with such sympathy
and such regret, their thinkers and poets were inspired
by grandiose intellectual abstractions. They saw
ideas, like gods, moving the world, and actual men
and women, actual events and things, were but the
passing symbols of these supernatural powers; 1866
and 1870 ended all that. The unification of Germany,
in the way we have discussed, diverted all their interest
from speculation about the universe, life, and mankind,
to the material interests of their new country.
Germany became the preoccupation of all Germans.
From abstractions they turned with a new intoxication
to what they conceived to be the concrete. Entering
thus late upon the stage of national politics, they
devoted themselves, with their accustomed thoroughness,
to learning and bettering what they conceived to be
the principles and the practice which had given success
to other nations. In this quest no scruples should
deter them, no sentimentality hamper, no universal
ideals distract. Yet this, after all, was but
German romanticism assuming another form. The
objects, it is true, were different. “Actuality”
had taken the place of ideals, Germany of Humanity.
But by the German vision the new objects were no less
distorted than the old. In dealing with “Real-politik”
(which is the German translation of Machiavellianism),
with “expansion,” with “survival
of the fittest,” and all the other shibboleths
of world-policy, their outlook remained as absolute
and abstract as before, as contemptuous of temperament
and measure, as blind to those compromises and qualifications,
those decencies, so to speak, of nature, by which
reality is constituted. The Germans now saw men
instead of gods, but they saw them as trees walking.