The relations of Russia to Germany have been and are of a confused and complicated character, changing as circumstances and personalities change.  But one permanent factor has been the sympathy between the governing elements in the two countries.  The governing class in Russia, indeed, has not only been inspired by German ideas, it has been largely recruited from men of German stock; and it has manifested all the contempt and hatred which is characteristic of the German bureaucracy for the ideals of democracy, liberty, and free thought.  The two Governments have always been ready to combine against popular insurrections, and in particular against every attempt of the Poles to recover their liberty.  They have been drawn and held together by a common interest in tyranny, and the renewal of that co-operation is one of the dangers of the future.  On the other hand, apart from and in opposition to this common political interest, there exists between the two nations a strong racial antagonism.  The Russian temperament is radically opposed to the German.  The one expresses itself in Panslavism, the other in Pangermanism.  And this opposition of temperament is likely to be deeper and more enduring than the sympathy of the one autocracy with the other.  But apart from this racial factor, there is in the south-east an opposition of political ambition.  Primarily, the Balkan question is an Austro-Russian rather than a Russo-German one.  Bismarck professed himself indifferent to the fate of the Balkan peoples, and even avowed a willingness to see Russia at Constantinople.  But recent years have seen, in this respect, a great change.  The alliance between Germany and Austria, dating from 1879, has become closer and closer as the Powers of the Entente have drawn together in what appeared to be a menacing combination.  It has been, for some time past, a cardinal principle of German policy to support her ally in the Balkans, and this determination has been increased by German ambitions in the East.  The ancient dream of Russia to possess Constantinople has been countered by the new German dream of a hegemony over the near East based upon the through route from Berlin via Vienna and Constantinople to Bagdad; and this political opposition has been of late years the determining factor in the relationship of the two Powers.  The danger of a Russo-German conflict has thus been very great, and since the Russo-French Entente Germany, as we have already pointed out, has seen herself menaced on either front by a war which would immediately endanger both.

Turning once more to the Belgian dispatches, we find such hints as the following.  On October 24, 1912, the Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Ambassador to London, writes as follows:—­