and it is quite easily checked by any other accountant
and skilled computer. A reader with a bad arithmetical
education, ignorant of the very existence of such
a thing as a slide rule, knowing nothing of account
keeping, who thinks of himself working out the resultant
fractions with a stumpy pencil on a bit of greasy paper
in a bad light, may easily think of this transfer
of fractions as a dangerous and terrifying process.
It is, for a properly trained man, the easiest, exactest
job conceivable. The Cash Register people will
invent machines to do it for you while you wait.
What happens, then, is that every candidate with more
than a quota, beginning with the top candidate, sheds
a traction of each vote he has received, down the list,
and the next one sheds his surplus fraction in the
same way, and so on until candidates lower in the
list, who are at first below the quota, fill up to
it. When all the surplus votes of the candidates
at the head of the list have been disposed of, then
the hopeless candidates at the bottom of the list
are dealt with. The second votes on their voting
papers are treated as whole votes and distributed
up the list, and so on. It will be plain to the
quick-minded that, towards the end, there will be a
certain chasing about of little fractions of votes,
and a slight modification of the quota due to voting
papers having no second or third preferences marked
upon them, a chasing about that it will be difficult
for an untrained intelligence to follow.
But untrained
intelligences are not required to follow it.
For the skilled computer these things offer no difficulty
at all. And they are not difficulties of principle
but of manipulation. One might as well refuse
to travel in a taxicab until the driver had explained
the magneto as refuse to accept the principle of Proportional
Representation by the single transferable vote until
one had remedied all the deficiencies of one’s
arithmetical education. The fundamental principle
of the thing, that a candidate who gets more votes
than he wants is made to hand on a fraction of each
vote to the voter’s second choice, and that
a candidate whose chances are hopeless is made to
hand on the whole vote to the voter’s second
choice, so that practically only a small number of
votes are ineffective, is within the compass of the
mind of a boy of ten.
But simple as this method is, it completely kills
the organization and manipulation of voting.
It completely solves the Goldbug-Wurstberg-Sanity
problem. It is knave-proof—short of
forging, stealing, or destroying voting papers.
A man of repute, a leaderly man, may defy all the
party organizations in existence and stand beside and
be returned over the head of a worthless man, though
the latter be smothered with party labels. That
is the gist of this business. The difference in
effect between Proportional Representation and the
old method of voting must ultimately be to change
the moral and intellectual quality of elected persons
profoundly. People are only beginning to realize
the huge possibilities of advance inherent in this
change of political method. It means no less
than a revolution from “delegate democracy”
to “selective democracy.”