“A typical example of this, is Fort les Ayvelles, which is intended to protect the bridges and Meuse crossings south of Mezieres-Charleville; the fort was levelled to the ground by 300 shots from our 21-centimetre howitzers.  It was built in 1878 and armed with forty cannon; of these the principal weapons consisted of two batteries each containing six 9-centimetre cannon, which, however, were cast in the years 1878-1880, and in the best case could only carry 4,000 yards.  Then there were some 12-centimetre bronze pieces cast in 1884, and a few five-barrelled revolver cannon.

“Besides these there were old howitzers from the year 1842; muzzle-loaders with the characteristic pyramids of cannon ball by the side, such as are often used in Germany at village festivals or to fire a salute.  The fort itself was a perfect picture of the obsolete and out-of-date.  Apart from the crude, primitive equipment, the organization must have been faulty indeed.

“On the road leading up to the fort we saw some tree-branches which had been hurriedly placed as obstacles, and higher up wire entanglements had been commenced at the last moment.  At least one battery was useless, for the field of fire was cut off by high trees, and at the last minute the garrison had tried to place the guns in a better position.

“Our artillery which fired from a north-westerly position displayed a precision of aim which is rare.  One battery had had nearly every gun put out of action by clean hits.  In several cases we saw the barrel of the gun yards away from its carriage, and only a heap of wheels, earth, stones, etc., marked the place where it had stood.

“Another proof of the excellent work done by the artillery, was the fact that hardly a shell had struck the earth in the 500 yards from the battery to the fort.  After the former had been disposed of, the artillery fire was concentrated on the fort, which was reduced to a heap of rubbish.  The stonework and the high walls—­yards thick—­had tumbled to pieces like a child’s box of bricks.

“A garrison of 900 men had been placed in this useless cage, and they had fled almost at the first shot.  Instead of putting these men in trenches, their superiors had put them at this ‘lost post’ and allowed them to suffer the moral effects of a complete, inevitable defeat.

“Near the fort I saw the grave of its commander, the unfortunate man who had witnessed the hopeless struggle.  He lived to see his men save their lives in wild flight—­and then ended his own."[147]

[Footnote 147:  Heinrich Binder:  “Mit dem Hauptquartier nach Westen,” pp. 107-9.]

Here we have a sorry picture of the poacher whom Germany feared so much.  The world knows now that neither Britain, France nor Russia were prepared for war, which excludes the probability that they desired or provoked a conflict.  But Germany knew that, and much more, in the month of July, 1914.  Bethmann-Hollweg when addressing the Reichstag drew a terrifying picture of French armies[148] standing ready to invade Belgium, but he knew full well that the necessary base-fortresses were lacking on the Franco-Belgian frontier.