[Footnote 142:  Professor Frank’s work, pp. 29-30.]

Considering that the British army at that time was small, that Britain had no idea of annexing Belgian territory, one naturally wonders how the value of Belgium’s defence system had been depreciated by conversations with British officers.  In effect, Germany maintains that Belgium should have behaved as a nonentity, which is contrary to all reason.

The Berlin Government has always treated her small neighbour as a sovereign State, equal in quality, though not in power, to any State in the world.  If Germany recognized Belgium’s sovereignty, why should not England do the same, and, above all, why had Belgium no right to think of her self-preservation, when she knew the danger on her eastern frontier grew more menacing month by month?

Frank concludes his dissertation with his opinion of England and quotes Thucydides, V., 105, as the best applicable characterization of the British with which he is acquainted.  “Among themselves, indeed, and out of respect for their traditional constitution, they prove to be quite decent.  As regards their treatment of foreigners, a great deal might be said, yet we will try to express it in brief.  Among all whom we know they are the most brazen in declaring what is good to be agreeable, and what is profitable to be just.”

The very offence which Germany accuses England of having premeditated, she committed herself many years before.  When France seemed to threaten Belgium’s existence, King Leopold I. concluded a secret treaty[143] with the king of Prussia, whereby the latter was empowered to enter Belgium and occupy fortresses in case of France becoming dangerous.  The French danger passed away, and its place was taken by a more awful menace—­the pressure of German potential energy; and when Belgium in turn opened her heart (this is the unproved accusation which Germany makes to-day—­Author) to England, then she has violated her neutrality and undermined the balance of power.[144] There is even a suspicion that Leopold II. renewed this treaty with Germany in 1890, in spite of the fact that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prince de Chimay, in an official speech denied its existence.

[Footnote 143:  Germans love anything which is “secret.”  “Geheimniskraemerei” ("affectation of mysteriousness and secrecy”) is a national and individual characteristic of the German people.—­Author.]

[Footnote 144:  Karl Hampe:  “Belgiens Vergangenheit und Gegenwart” ("Belgium Past and Present"), p. 49.]

Professor Schoenborn’s essay on Belgian neutrality is the least satisfactory exposition of the three professorial effusions; it is no credit to a man of learning, and is merely the work of an incapable partisan trying to make a bad cause into a good one.  Schoenborn commences[145] with the customary German tactics by stating that Bethmann-Hollweg’s “scrap-of-paper” speech, and von Jagow’s (German Secretary of State) explanations to the Belgian representative in Berlin on August 3rd, 1914, are of no importance in deciding the justice of Germany’s violation of her pledged word.  One is led to inquire, When is a German utterance—­whether given in the Reichstag by the Chancellor or on paper in the form of a treaty—­final and binding?