The reply evoked a hurricane of “bravos.”

A parallel may be found in the year 1870.  The central committee of German Social Democrats passed a resolution that:  “It is absolutely necessary for the party to organize simultaneously in all parts of the country great popular demonstrations against the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and pass resolutions in favour of an honourable peace with the French republic.”

Nothing came of the movement, for on September 9th the committee was placed under arrest and prosecuted.  If Germany should be victorious in this war, it is to be assumed that the Socialists would again prove powerless to prevent annexation.  What the allies cannot hinder, the Social Democrats would be still more helpless to prevent; especially as the great majority of them are unreservedly on the side of the Kaiser and his Government.  When in need, the latter flattered and persuaded the Democrats to vote for an alleged war of defence; but should German arms be victorious the German Government would neither seek, nor accept advice on her national projects, from her quondam internationalists.

There are grounds for suspicion that the party is playing a game desired by the Berlin Government.  For some months past they have tried every means possible to arrange personal interviews with the leaders of the corresponding party in France—­the French “comrades” have refused to meet them.  The Leipziger Volkszeitung for July 16th, 1915, contains more than a column about “We and the French,” in which the German party spreads the usual Teutonic lime of sophistry and empty phrases.

One passage betrays the entire intrigue.  They wish their “French brothers” to agree to a peace without annexations, which means, in so many words, that the French Socialists are to renounce Alsace-Lorraine for ever.  Had they been, or should they be in the future, so foolish as to enter this German mouse-trap, then before the war has reached a decisive conclusion, a large section of the French nation would be pledged to renounce the lost provinces even in case of a German defeat.  This is an excellent instance of the manner in which German Social Democracy works in an enemy country to assist its own Government.  In like manner, the Independent Labour Party and Union of Democratic Control are forces exceedingly sensitive to German influence, and in a decisive moment can be set in motion by the German “comrades.”

The hundred and eleven Social Democrats in the Reichstag have no real power in Germany.  If they possess any degree of power, then fear for their own skins, prevents them from risking its exercise.  Their real opinion concerning Alsace-Lorraine appeared in the same journal four days later.  “According to our opinion it would be a crime, if France made the return of these provinces a condition of peace.”  In the same article an accusation of one-sidedness is made against the Socialists in France for supporting the French Government.  After which, it is not surprising that every time the names of the Genossen Macdonald, Snowden, Hardie and Newbold occur in the Leipziger Volkszeitung, they are mentioned with awe and reverence.