One instance will suffice to illustrate the everyday routine of the class-war (Klassenkampf) in which the whole energies of the Social Democrats have been absorbed for a quarter of a century. An acquaintance of the author’s, Major Schub, in the 19th Infantry Regiment, stationed in Erlangen, dared some years ago to send his orderly with a she-goat to a peasant in the district who kept the indispensable he-goat. Two days later he was pilloried in a Furth paper for calling upon a private soldier to fulfil such a degrading office. German workmen do not read the Vorwaerts (its circulation is well under 100,000), but they read one or other of the seventy purveyors of filth and class hatred which form the stock-in-trade of the Social Democratic Party.
The author of this work, knew as early as July 25th, that reserve officers had been warned to hold themselves in readiness; on succeeding days he saw tangible evidence that mobilization was proceeding stealthily, and it would be ridiculous for him to claim greater knowledge than the hundred and eleven S.D. members of the Reichstag, and the seventy-seven editors of their party papers—especially when these have an army of millions of spies at their command.
In order to obtain a correct judgment of the motives which actuated German Social Democrats in their complete support of the German Government it is necessary to consult the works published by them during the war. Karl Kautsky writes:[74] “That which under these circumstances, was most immediate and pressing in determining the attitude to war, not only for the masses, but also many of our leaders, was the fear of a hostile invasion, the urgent necessity to keep the enemy out of our territory, no matter what the causes, object or results of the war may be. This fear was never greater and more justified than on this occasion; never have the devastating results of invasion been more terrible. Belgium and East Prussia speak plainly.
[Footnote 74: “Die Internationalitaet und der Krieg.” Berlin, 1915; p. 32.]
“The increased size of the armies greatly extends the unavoidable desolation of war, and in addition to this a second strongly-working popular motive decides the attitude of a nation to war, viz., the interest of the entire people in the fate of an army in which every family is represented.”
It thus becomes evident that no motives of justice, right or wrong, or politics played any part in the decision arrived at, but merely a great fear which impelled the Social Democrats to consider first and foremost how to save their own skins.