[Footnote 7: Professor Hermann Oncken: “Deutschland und der Weltkrieg,” pp. 545-6.]
Even the claim that Austria showed some inclination to permit mediation on the points in her ultimatum to Serbia which were incompatible with Serbia’s sovereignty, has been categorically denied. The Vienna Fremdenblatt for September 24th, 1914, contains this official announcement:
“Vienna, September 24th. In a report of the late British Ambassador published by the British Government, there is a passage which maintains that Austria-Hungary’s Ambassador, Count Szapary, in St. Petersburg had informed Monsieur Sasonow, Russia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Austria-Hungary ’was willing to submit the points in her Note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with Serbian independence, to mediation.’
“We have been informed officially that this statement is absolutely untrue; according to the nature of the step taken by the monarchy in Belgrade, it would have been absolutely unthinkable. The passage cited from the British Ambassador’s report, as well as some other phrases in the same, are evidently inspired by a certain bias. They are intended to prove, by asserting that Austria-Hungary was prepared to yield on some points at issue, that German diplomacy was really responsible for the outbreak of war.
“Such attempts cannot obscure the truth, that Austria-Hungary and Germany concurred in the wish to preserve European peace. If this wish has not been fulfilled, and a European conflict has arisen out of a local settlement, it can only be ascribed to the circumstance that Russia first threatened Austria-Hungary and then Germany by an unjustifiable mobilization. By this she forced war upon the Central Powers and thus kindled a general conflagration.”
In dealing with Germany’s endeavours for peace Professor Oncken writes on p. 546 of “Deutschland und der Weltkrieg” ("Germany and the World War"): “The work of German diplomacy took the form of giving warnings and peaceful explanations.” On July 26th she pointed out to the Russian Government that “preparatory military measures on Russia’s part would compel Germany to take corresponding steps, viz., the mobilization of the army. Mobilization means war.” Oncken does not quote any of the “peaceful explanations” (friedliche Erklaerungen), and much as the present writer would like to fill up this gap in his work, he must admit his utter inability, because in the diplomatic correspondence he can only find exasperating threats, thrown out to Russia by the two Germanic Empires.
The whole problem allows of a very simple digest: On July 23rd, Austria-Hungary handed her ultimatum to Serbia, therein stating her demands, and on the following day informed all the European powers of her attitude. The neutral Press of the world and an unusually large section of the German Press, immediately pronounced Austria’s position to be indefensible and untenable. The German Government, in spite of these facts, gave its official and unreserved support to Austria’s attitude on July 26th. After eight weeks of war (on September 25th), Austria officially declared that she had never swerved from her original claims, nor ever felt any inclination to do so.