“After Grey’s refusal, Prince Lichnowsky pressed him to formulate England’s conditions for her neutrality.  At the same time the Ambassador increased his offer of July 29th by proposing to guarantee the integrity of France and her colonies in return for England’s neutrality.  Grey suppressed this proposal too before the Cabinet, as any negotiation on this basis would have thwarted his pre-conceived plans.  Only an immovable determination for war can explain this behaviour.

“Even before he could assume that Belgian neutrality was in danger, he pledged English policy to the wishes of France.  On the afternoon of the same August 1st, he gave the French Ambassador—­who was anxiously pressing for a decision—­reason to believe that he would be able to give a formal promise on the following day.  At the Cabinet meeting on August 2nd—­the same in which he suppressed Germany’s offer!—­he got a motion accepted empowering him to assure Cambon that if Germany attacked the French coast, England would intervene.”

It is necessary to return to Germany’s proposal in regard to Belgian neutrality.  In simple language it means that Germany wanted to sell her pledged word, given in 1839, for British neutrality in 1914.  In view of the fact that Professor Oncken looked upon this as a legitimate bargain, one wonders in silence at his standard of morality and honour.  Is he not a scoundrel who first gives his word of honour and afterwards tries to strike a bargain with the same?  Stripped of all verbiage that is Germany’s proposal in its naked immorality, and the author chronicles with pleasure that the House of Commons cried down even its discussion.  It recalls to his memory the fact, that the Reichstag—­Germany’s highest legislative assembly—­cheered to the echo Bethmann-Hollweg’s announcement that German armies, in violating the dictates of moral and international law, by breaking Germany’s word of honour, had occupied Luxembourg and entered Belgium.  The two incidents are drastic, concrete illustrations of the gulf which separates British and German conceptions of right and wrong.

Furthermore, there are two questions of a disciplinary nature arising out of this incident which “the man in the street” has a perfect right to raise.  Assuming that Sir Edward Grey exercised his discretion and concealed the “infamous proposal” from the Cabinet, which of his colleagues afterwards betrayed the fact and from what source—­German or English—­did he obtain his information?

Full knowledge on these points would probably be of great assistance in destroying the “trail of the serpent” (i.e., German influence and intrigues) in the political and national life of Great Britain.

Professor Oncken praises German disinterestedness in offering to guarantee the integrity of French continental and colonial territories in case Germany gained a victory in the war.  Sir Edward Grey’s refusal to guarantee British neutrality in return for this promise, the professor considers supreme and final proof that Britain was bent on war.  The nation has rightly approved of this policy and the point need not be argued in this place; but Professor Oncken in the seclusion of his German study would do well to weigh two problems: