It is impossible to get rid of the suspicion that Germany thought Austria might accept the proposal; in any case, Germany deliberately shattered the last chance of a settlement by her demand that Russia should demobilize.

If Germany outwardly worked for peace in St. Petersburg, as M. de l’Escaille states, it would be quite in harmony with the methods of German diplomacy.  But, as the same gentleman testifies:  “Austria would not yield a step”—­the conclusion must be drawn that Germany had ordered her to stand firm.  Austria did not yield a single inch, and so it is a matter of indifference as to the sincerity or otherwise of Germany’s peace endeavours.

Oncken further mentions Britain’s refusal to remain neutral in return for a promise that French territory should not be annexed, but he omits the question of French colonies.  His analysis of the Belgian question deserves quotation:  “Grey was seeking an excuse for war, and he found one in the question of Belgian neutrality.  It was just such a reason as he required in order to carry away the Cabinet, Parliament and public opinion.  And since then that reason has been much discussed, accompanied by appeals to international law and humanity, by England’s and the world’s Press.

“But there is more than one irrefutable proof at hand, to show that this reason for war, was merely a veil covering the real ones.  Anticipating Grey’s intentions, before the German Government had finally declared themselves on the subject,[207] Prince Lichnowsky put the question to Sir Edward Grey on August 1st, as to whether England would remain neutral if Germany undertook to respect the neutrality of Belgium.

[Footnote 207:  Britain had asked Germany a day or two before, whether she would respect Belgium’s neutrality.—­Author.]

“Grey, however, refused to give the pledge with which he could—­if he was really concerned about Belgium—­have spared that unhappy land its terrible fate.  But by these means the trump card of Belgian neutrality had been taken from our opponent’s hand in advance.  Yet Grey actually considered it permissible to conceal this offer from the British Cabinet.  Yes, he dared even more.

“After the matter had been mentioned by Ramsay Macdonald in the Labour Leader, Keir Hardie asked a question in the House of Commons on August 27th, as to whether Lichnowsky’s proposal had been submitted to the Cabinet, and why the same had not been made the basis of peaceful negotiations with Germany.  Grey made a weak attempt to discriminate between official proposals made by a government, and a private question asked by an ambassador.

“When the inconvenient questioner asked for further information, he was cried down.  The Oxford theologian Conybeare gained the impression from this Parliamentary incident:  ’That all Sir Edward Grey’s answers to Mr. Keir Hardie’s questions are examples of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi.’  His later revocation of this judgment does not alter its value as objective evidence.