Another phase of Professor Oncken’s work is the open attack on Sir Edward Grey.  Only three years ago this statesman was acclaimed in Germany as a man of peace—­the man who had prevented the Balkan War from becoming a European conflagration.  To-day he is accused by the same nation of being the originator of the world war.

Oncken[201] goes back to the year 1905 and states that Sir Edward Grey initiated only two members of the Cabinet—­Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane—­into the details of the agreement with France, and these three gentlemen he refers to as the “inner circle.”  King Edward, and afterwards Sir Edward Grey in continuing the late King’s policy, succeeded in harnessing the revanche idee and the spirit of Russian aggression to the chariot of British Imperialism.  All offers of friendship made by this country were insincere. (The professorial pleader does not say so, but he leaves his readers to infer that sincerity is a German monopoly.) Concerning the British Minister’s declaration in Parliament that no secret treaty existed with France, Oncken remarks:  “The declaration was just as true formally as it was a lie in essentials.”

[Footnote 201:  The authorities (?) most frequently cited by Professor Oncken in making out his case are Messrs. Morel, Macdonald, Hardie, G. B. Shaw and the Labour Leader.—­Author.]

Following the development of events after the conference proposal had been dropped, Oncken writes:  “Meanwhile the Russian Government endeavoured to persuade England’s leading statesman that the opinion prevailed in Germany and Austria, that England would remain neutral in every case, in consequence of this delusion the Central Powers were obdurate.  England could only dispel the danger of war by destroying this false conception, i.e., openly joining Russia and France.

“It is noteworthy how quickly Grey assimilated this train of thought.  Disregarding the suggestions of the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, he did nothing to exercise a moderating influence upon Russia and thereby further the success of the conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg.  On the other hand, he proceeded to take steps which probably in his opinion, were calculated to damp the supposed desire for war on the part of Germany.  Practically, the result of all his actions was to exercise one-sided pressure upon Germany and Austria and simultaneously, through unmistakable declarations concerning England’s eventual attitude, to encourage Paris and St. Petersburg to energetic measures.

“But all hopes for peace were destroyed at a single blow by Russia.  On the evening of July 30th after the conversations with Austria-Hungary had been resumed, Sasonow increased his demands—­and in truth with England’s co-operation—­to such a degree that their acceptance would have meant the complete submission of the Dual Monarchy.

“And as if this were insufficient, a few hours later, before a reply had been received and while negotiations were proceeding in Vienna, Russia suddenly broke off the communications with a momentous decision (mobilization).  The certainty which she had gained from the moves of English diplomacy, that in case of war she was sure of France’s support and with it England’s, turned the scale—­against peace.