“Only those who had followed the growing intimacy of the mutual obligations between the Entente Powers, and their organization to a ‘London Centre’ during the summer of 1914, are able to estimate the role—­to say nothing of Italy—­which Russia’s two comrades would have played in the conference.  During its course Russia would have continued her military preparations, while Germany would have had to pledge herself not to mobilize.

“Finally, no unprejudiced observer would dare assert that the man (Sir Edward Grey) who was ready to transform himself at a suitable opportunity into an ally of Russia, would have been an impartial chairman in a conference held under the pressure of a Russian mobilization.  The more one thinks about this mediation proposal the more convinced one becomes, that it would at least have worked for a diplomatic victory for the Entente Powers.

“Grey put the whole machinery of the Triple Entente in motion in order to force back Germany and Austria-Hungary along the whole line."[200]

[Footnote 200:  Ibid., p. 545 et seq.]

An analysis of Professor Oncken’s theses gives the following results:  First, Britain’s efforts to preserve peace are admitted, but he fails to mention any friendly advances to meet them.  Secondly, the fundamental principle underlying the Germanic attitude is again exposed, viz., that Russia had no right to intervene in a question affecting the balance of power in the Balkans and in Europe (vide, p. 63).  Thirdly, a diplomatic struggle was in progress along the whole line, between the two groups of Powers.

In weighing the second point it would be wrong to assume that the Central Empires were not fully aware of the presence of a far more vital question behind the Austro-Serbian conflict.  They knew it from the very beginning and had already expressed threats in St. Petersburg, hoping to achieve the same effect as in the Bosnian crisis.  If Austria had been allowed to destroy Serbia’s military power the material forces of Europe would have been seriously disturbed; the ineffectiveness of the Triple Entente finally established, and its dissolution the inevitable consequence.

If these considerations are correct then the statement attributed by M. de L’Escaille (see p. 281) to Sir George Buchanan that Britain would never draw the sword could only have served to strengthen the resolution of the Germanic Powers in enforcing their point Germany above all desired that the balance of power theory should be finally smashed, and it may be safely assumed that an Austro-Serbian conflict seemed to her a most fitting opportunity to realize her purpose.

The third point suggests two questions.  Who provoked the diplomatic conflict, and who would have benefited most by a diplomatic victory?  A reply to the first question is superfluous, and the answer to the second is obvious from the preceding line of reasoning.  Germany would have reached the goal towards which she had striven for more than a decade—­the removal of all diplomatic hindrances to the unlimited assertion of her will in Europe.  It may even be doubted whether the Dual Alliance would have survived the shock.