Further they believed the latter constellation to be the more aggressive of the two, and formally reported these convictions to the Belgian Government.  If read as a modern edition of “Pepys’ Diary” they form entertaining literature, but by no stretch of the imagination could they be classed as historical sources.  A gentleman who reports to his Government that King Edward took breakfast in company with M. Delcasse and that the Press had neglected to chronicle the incident, can hardly rank as an historian.

Moreover, it is by no means clear why the German Press should laud M. Greindl as a gentleman of German origin.  If this be true it would probably explain everything which deserves explanation in the said documents, and would probably account for the intimate, confidential treatment which M. Greindl received at the hands of German officials.

German newspapers are gloating over the fact that the British Government has not deigned to reply to these “revelations.”  There is really nothing to which it can reply; three observers expressed their opinion on contemporaneous happenings during the years 1905-1911.  But a brutal sequence of events in 1914 showed them—­if they had not been convinced during the preceding three years—­that they had drawn false conclusions from their observations.

To return to the last trial of strength between the two groups of European Powers, it is interesting to note that Professor Oncken denies German participation in formulating the ultimatum to Serbia, or that Germany was aware of its contents.  Germany merely left Austria a free hand in the matter.  Oncken endeavours to show that Austria’s demands were not excessive, and expresses astonishment that the opposing Powers found them exorbitant.  He does not mention the fact that a large section of the German nation held the same opinion on July 25th, 1914.

His comment on Sir Edward Grey’s efforts for peace is characteristic:  “England claims that she did everything possible to preserve the peace.  It cannot be denied that Grey made a series of mediation proposals.  But mere good-will is not everything.  It is much more important to weigh their practical importance, and the goal at which they aimed:  Whether they were intended to preserve the world’s peace under conditions honourable for all parties, or calculated to obtain for the Entente a one-sided diplomatic victory which would have established its future predominance."[199]

[Footnote 199:  “Deutschland und der Weltkrieg,” p. 544.]

“Grey considered the moment suitable for a mediation proposal.  On the evening of July 26th, after obtaining Russia’s consent, he proposed to the Governments of France, Germany and Italy that their London ambassadors should meet in London to confer on a peaceful solution of the conflict.

“The proposal was unacceptable to Austria, because it would have been an indirect recognition on her part of Russia’s interest in the conflict.