A cardinal point in Germany’s programme has been the consistent manner in which she has tried to separate her European neighbours from Britain in order to deal with them separately or alone.  That her endeavours ended in failure is due to the instinct of self-preservation which has drawn Germany’s opponents closer together, in exact proportion to the increasing force of her efforts.  Both in peace and war, Germany desired and endeavoured to switch off Britain’s influence in Europe.

The diplomatic battles of 1905, 1908 and 1911 were a few of the efforts to dislodge Great Britain from her ententes, while her repeated attempts to buy this country’s neutrality, down to the eve of war, are proof that Germany wanted a free hand in Europe.[192] If she had succeeded in her purpose, it is exceedingly doubtful whether any Power could have prevented her from exercising a free hand in the whole world.

[Footnote 192:  Professor Schiemann:  “Wie England eine Verstaendigung mit Deutschland verhinderte” ("How England prevented an Understanding with Germany").  Berlin, 1915; pp. 20-21:  “From the very commencement Berlin was convinced that the probability of a combined Franco-Russian attack was exceedingly small, if England’s entrance to this Germanophobe combination could be prevented.  Therefore we endeavoured to secure England’s neutrality in case of war (1909), that is, if an Anglo-German alliance could not be achieved—­an alliance which would have guaranteed the world’s peace.” (Schiemann’s insinuation that Germany desired an alliance is an instance of suggestio falsi.  Germany had decided in 1902 never to conclude an alliance with this country.—­Author.)]

Coming down to the last trial of diplomatic power, we are confronted by the immovable fact, that it too was a challenge on the part of the Central Empires.  The conditions seemed peculiarly favourable to them, for the British Ambassador declared to the Russian Government on July 24th, 1914, that Britain would never draw the sword on a purely Serbian question.  Moreover, in the preceding year, a British minister, says Professor Schiemann, had given what we may style a remarkable semi-official promise that Great Britain would never go to war with Germany.

“On February 18th, 1913, Mr. Charles Trevelyan, M.P., paid me a visit, and assured me with the greatest certainty that England would under no circumstances wage war on Germany.  A ministry which made preparations for war, would be immediately overthrown."[193]

[Footnote 193:  Ibid., p. 27.  In the light of this revelation it would be interesting to know what was the real motive which induced Mr. Trevelyan to resign his office when war broke out.  Either he was conscious of having seriously compromised his position as a Minister of the Crown, or he conscientiously believed that Britain was drawing the sword in an unjust cause.  Unfortunately a section of the British public accepted the latter interpretation.  In any case, Mr. Trevelyan’s indiscretion affords overwhelming proof that he had an utterly false conception of Germany.—­Author.]