[Footnote 189:  Graf Ernst zu Reventlow:  “Der Vampir des Festlandes ("England, the Vampire of the Continent").  Berlin, 1915, p. 117.  “England’s withdrawal from the policy which sought to establish a mutual plan of procedure in world politics between Germany and Britain dates from the time when Britain recognized that Germany would not allow herself to be employed against Russia.  In Germany to-day, voices may be heard proclaiming that von Buelow chose wrongly in refusing England’s offer, especially as Russia has repaid our loyalty and friendship with iniquitous ingratitude.  The latter represents the truth.

“But in judging the policy of that period two factors must be borne in mind.  The acceptance of Great Britain’s offer would have placed a tie upon the German Empire which would have been unendurable.  Germany would have become the strong but stupid Power, whose duty would have been to fight British battles on the continent.  Besides which the choice concerned Germany’s world future, above all the development of the German war fleet.”]

But as Professor Marcks (p. 315) observes:  “Germany refused the hand extended to her.”  Count Reventlow and a host of other writers have chronicled the fact too, yet on September 2nd, 1914, the German Chancellor dared to say to representative American journalists:  “When the archives are opened then the world will learn how often Germany has offered the hand of friendship to England.”

It is only one more confirmation that the “law of necessity” is incompatible with the truth.  The truth is that Germany preferred to drive Britain into another and hostile camp rather than have her friendship.  Germany preferred British hostility rather than relinquish her plans for unlimited naval expansion—­which she believed to be the only means of destroying Britain’s position, and with that resolution already taken the Kaiser presented his photograph to a distinguished Englishman with this significant remark written on it with his own hand:  “I bide my time!”

Although Britain drew the sword to defend Belgium, the supreme issue—­and the only one which occupies the German mind to-day—­is whether this country shall continue to hold the position allotted to her by destiny and confirmed by history, or whether she is to be supplanted by Germany.  That is the one political thought which permeates German intelligence at this moment, and no other considerations must be allowed to darken this issue.

Professor Oncken reviews the events of the period 1900-1914 in considerable detail, and to him the policy of ententes appears to be the main cause leading up to the world war.  From this alone it is obvious that, consciously or unconsciously, he is wrong; the ententes in themselves are results, not prime causes.  The prime causes leading to these political agreements are to be found in Germany’s attitude to the rest of Europe.  In a word they were defensive actions taken by the Powers concerned, as a precaution against German aggression.