As soon as the latter perceived that French genius and persistency were bearing fruit in a magnificent colonial empire, the innate jealousy and greed of the German nation led to a policy of colonial pinpricks on the part of the Kaiser’s Government.  This seems the most probable explanation of Germany’s attitude during the last decade before 1914.  The natural consequence was that those powers which had most to fear through German ill-will were welded together more firmly in a policy of self-protection.

Germany cannot, or will not, recognize that the causes of the above-mentioned development are to be found solely and alone in her own actions.  On the contrary, she designates the “consequences” a world-wide conspiracy against German interests.  In naval affairs she adopts the same naive line of argument.  First and foremost Germany committed herself to a policy of unlimited—­even provocative—­naval expansion.  When the Power most concerned—­Great Britain—­took precautionary measures to guarantee British interests in view of Germany’s “peaceful” development, then the latter Power declared the consequences of her own actions to be a hostile initiative directed against her.

A defence of this kind may be convincing for those who observe events in the German perspective, but it will be unable to withstand impartial historical criticism.  Boxers expect a rebound when they “punch the ball,” but none of them would be so foolish as to deny having delivered a blow when the rebound takes place.  Yet that is the unscientific defence which Germany has adopted in her endeavours to explain away her aggressive attitude to Belgium, France, and Great Britain.

In a word, the principles underlying saigner a blanc have grown during the past four decades into a possible avalanche possessing huge potential energy; the momentum was given to it in August, 1914.

If it were necessary, a picture of German popular opinion might be projected, showing how that opinion was influenced and formed during the critical days at the close of July last year.  But from considerations of space only the outlines of the picture can be given.  Before the war German newspapers abounded in reports of French unpreparedness and chaos.  The German public was informed that France dreaded and feared war with Germany.

“Without any exaggeration it may be said that a state of nerves has seized the French nation, such as we should seek for in vain at the time of Tangiers and Agadir.  There is tremendous excitement, which in many reports suggests absolute panic."[162]

[Footnote 162:  Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten, August 1st.]

The Paris correspondent of the Koelnische Zeitung (August 4th) on returning to Cologne wrote:  “Conditions in France afford a striking picture of bad organization.  War rage possesses the people; but such an enthusiasm as I found in Germany on my return is unknown to them.”