of principle.  They avowed the most absolute selfishness, the most abject fear of death and pain, with a frankness that would have amazed the Cynics and disgusted the felons of almost any Earthly nation.  There were partial exceptions, but these were to be found exclusively among those in training for what we should call public life, for administrative or judicial duties.  These, though professing no devotion to the interest of others, and little that could be called public spirit, did nevertheless understand that in return for the high rank, the great power, and the liberal remuneration they would enjoy, they were bound to consider primarily the public interest in the performance of their functions—­the right of society to just or at least to carefully legal judgment, and diligent efficient administration.  Their feeling, however, was rather professional than personal, the pride of students in the perfection of their art rather than the earnestness of men conscious of grave human responsibilities.

In conversing with the chief of this Faculty, I learned some peculiarities of the system of government with which I was not yet acquainted.  Promotion never depends on those with whom a public servant comes into personal contact, but on those one or two steps above the latter.  The judges, for instance, of the lower rank are selected by the principal judge of each dominion; these and their immediate assistants, by the Chief of the highest Court.  The officers around and under the Governor of a province are named by the Regent of the dominion; those surrounding the Regent, as the Regent himself, by the Sovereign.  Every officer, however, can be removed by his immediate superior; but it depends on the chief with whom his appointment rests, whether he shall be transferred to a similar post elsewhere or simply dismissed.  Thus, while no man can be compelled to work with instruments he dislikes, no subordinate is at the mercy of personal caprice or antipathy.

Promotion, judicial and administrative, ends below the highest point.  The judges of the Supreme Court are named by the Sovereign—­with the advice of a Council, including the Regents, the judges of that Court, and the heads of the Philosophic and Educational Institutes—­from among the advocates and students of law, or from among the ablest administrators who seem to possess judicial faculties.  The code is written and simple.  Every dubious point that arises in the course of litigation is referred, by appeal or directly by the judge who decides it, to the Chief Court, and all points of interpretation thus referred, are finally settled by an addition to the code at its periodical revision.  The Sovereign can erase or add at pleasure to this code.  But he can do so only in full Council, and must hear, though he need not regard, the opinions of his advisers.  He can, however, suspend immediately till the next meeting of the Council the enforcement of any article.