Then began efforts on the part of Great Britain to localize the war.  Sir Edward Grey, the able foreign secretary in Mr. Asquith’s cabinet, repeated solemn warnings in every chancellery of Europe.  According to the English “white book,” the very day that he was notified of the violent tone of Austria’s note to Servia—­the day it was presented—­he warned the Austrian Ambassador in London that if as many as four of the Great Powers of Europe were to engage in war, it would involve the expenditure of such a vast sum of money and such interference with trade, that a complete collapse of European credit and industry would follow.  The reply of Russia to this warning was quite conciliatory.  The Russian foreign minister, M. Sazonoff, assured the British minister that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and would take no action unless forced.  Austria’s action, M. Sazonoff added, in reality aimed at over-throwing Russia’s influence in the Balkans.

Thus, on Monday, July 27, Sir Edward Grey was able to state in the House of Commons that his suggestion of a joint conference, composed of the Ambassadors of Germany, France and Italy, and himself, with a view to mediation between Austria and Russia, had been accepted by all except Germany, which power had expressed its concurrence with the plan in principle, but opposed the details on the ground that there was a prospect of direct “conversations” (diplomatic exchanges) between Austria and Russia.  This statement was believed in England to lack sincerity.  On that Monday afternoon the Russian Ambassador at Vienna warned Austria that Russia would not give way and expressed his hope that some arrangement might be arrived at before Servia was invaded.

Austria’s reply came next day in the shape of a formal declaration of war against Servia.

GERMANY’S ATTITUDE PRO-AUSTRIAN

On July 30 Sir M. de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, made the following statement to Sir Edward Grey regarding the attitude of Germany in the crisis:  “Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor.  I know from the German Ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it.”

Naturally enough the Russian foreign minister complained that “conversations” with Austria were useless in the face of such facts.  Russia then declared that her forces would be mobilized the day that Austria crossed the Servian frontier.  The attitude of Germany at once stiffened and it became evident that Germany meant to regard even the partial mobilization of Russia as a ground for war, not only against Russia, but also against the latter’s ally, France.

In vain Russia protested that her partial mobilization was merely a precaution.  In vain did the Czar himself offer to give his word that no use would be made of any of his forces.  Germany was aware, as subsequent facts have proved, that her own state of mobilization was very much further advanced than that of Russia.