As a soldier the Cossack is altogether unique; his ways are his own and his confidence in his officers and himself is perfect.  His passionate love of horses makes his work a pleasure.  The Cossack seat on horseback is on a high pad-saddle, with the knee almost vertical and the heel well drawn back.  Spurs are not worn, and another remarkable thing is that he has absolutely no guard to his sword.  The Russian soldier scorns buttons; he says, “They are a nuisance; they have to be cleaned, they wear away the cloth, they are heavy, and they attract the attention of the enemy.”

The Cossack pony is a quaint little beast to look at, but the finest animal living for his work, and very remarkable for his wonderful powers of endurance.  The Cossack and his mount have been likened to a clever nurse and a spoilt child—­each understands and loves the other, but neither is completely under control.  The Cossack does not want his horse to be a slave, and recognizes perfectly that horses, like children, have their whims and humors and must be coaxed and reasoned with, but rarely punished.  The famous knout (whip) is carried by the Cossacks at the end of a strap across the left shoulder.  Most of the men are bearded and in full dress, with the high fur cap stuck jauntily on the head of square cut hair, the Cossack presents a picturesque and martial figure.  The appearance of these men is quite different from that of the clean-shaven regular infantryman of the Russian army.

RUSSIAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

“While the direct objective of the Russians was Berlin, there were many reasons why a bee-line course could not be followed.  Germany had prepared an elaborate defense system to cover the direct approaches to Berlin, and the fortresses of Danzig, Graudenz, Thorn, and Posen were important points in this scheme.  The nature of the country also adapts itself to these defensive works and would make progress slow for an attacker.

Moreover, as Austria and her forces mobilized before Russia, a diversion was created by the Austrian invasion of south Poland, in which the Germans also took the offensive.  Under these circumstances the Russian plan of campaign resolved itself into three parts:—­

(1) A northern movement from Kovno and Grodno on Insterburg and Koenigsberg as a counter-attack.

(2) A central movement from Warsaw towards Posen with supporting movements north and south.

(3) A southern movement on Lublin in Poland to repulse the invaders combined with a movement from the east on Lemberg in order to turn the Austrian flank.

The first purpose of Russia was to clear Poland of enemies, as they threatened the Russian left flank.  At the same time Russia took the offensive by an invasion of Prussia in the north.  This latter movement led to a victory at Gumbinnen and the investment of Koenigsberg.  Later came victory at Lublin, rolling back the Austrians, and the capture of Lemberg, which signalized the Russian invasion of Austrian territory.  Thus Russia was for awhile clear of the enemy, while she established a strong footing in both Prussia and Austria.