difficult problem of forming such a political aggregate
as the United States have become. For obviously
the preservation of local self-government is essential
to the very idea of a federal union. Without
the Town-Meeting, or its equivalent in some form or
other, the Federal Union would become ipso facto
converted into a centralizing imperial government.
Should anything of this sort ever happen—should
American towns ever come to be ruled by prefects appointed
at Washington, and should American States ever become
like the administrative departments of France, or even
like the counties of England at the present day—then
the time will have come when men may safely predict
the break-up of the American political system by reason
of its overgrown dimensions and the diversity of interests
between its parts. States so unlike one another
as Maine and Louisiana and California cannot be held
together by the stiff bonds of a centralizing government.
The durableness of the federal union lies in its flexibility,
and it is this flexibility which makes it the only
kind of government, according to modern ideas, that
is permanently applicable to a whole continent.
If the United States were to-day a consolidated republic
like France, recent events in California might have
disturbed the peace of the country. But in the
federal union, if California, as a state sovereign
within its own sphere, adopts a grotesque constitution
that aims at infringing on the rights of capitalists,
the other states are not directly affected. They
may disapprove, but they have neither the right nor
the desire to interfere. Meanwhile the laws of
nature quietly operate to repair the blunder.
Capital flows away from California, and the business
of the state is damaged, until presently the ignorant
demagogues lose favour, the silly constitution becomes
a dead-letter, and its formal repeal begins to be
talked of. Not the smallest ripple of excitement
disturbs the profound peace of the country at large.
It is in this complete independence that is preserved
by every state, in all matters save those in which
the federal principle itself is concerned, that we
find the surest guaranty of the permanence of the
American political system. Obviously no race of
men, save the race to which habits of self-government
and the skilful use of political representation had
come to be as second nature, could ever have succeeded
in founding such a system.
Yet even by men of English race, working with out let or hindrance from any foreign source, and with the better part of a continent at their disposal for a field to work in, so great a political problem as that of the American Union has not been solved without much toil and trouble. The great puzzle of civilization—how to secure permanent concert of action without sacrificing independence of action—is a puzzle which has taxed the ingenuity of Americans as well as of older Aryan peoples. In the year 1788 when our Federal Union was completed, the problem had already