The number of guns lost by the Second Army was very great.  I am told that one reason for this was the fact that the High Command had for some weeks been preparing a further big offensive against the Plateau of Ternova, had concentrated an abnormal number of Batteries on the Second Army Front, and had pushed the majority of the guns much further up than would have been justified, if an enemy offensive had been expected.  Then, having made these preparations, the High Command hesitated and began to change its mind.  But the disposition of the forward Batteries, thoroughly unsound for defensive purposes, was not appreciably altered, and a quite small enemy advance sufficed to make enormous captures of guns.

When the attack developed, some of the troops in the Caporetto sector unquestionably turned and ran, as troops of every great Army in this war have at times turned and run, under conditions of greater or less provocation.  Then the High Command apparently lost its head, and attempted to issue to the world a communique of a character unparalleled in the history of this war, naming and cursing, as traitors to their country, certain particular Infantry Brigades.  This document was very properly suppressed by the Italian Government.

But where were the reserves which the High Command should have had ready to repair the broken line?  And where were the plans for retreating to prepared positions only a short distance behind?  It was well known, and indeed it used to be another boast of the High Command, that a local reverse would be of no great importance, seeing that there were no less than twelve prepared lines between the Front, as it then ran, and Udine.  I have seen some of those lines with my own eyes.  I know what great and patient labour went to the making of them, and I know how strong they were.  But, when the moment came to make use of them, no one outside the charmed circle of the High Command was in possession of the plans for their defence, and for falling back upon them in an orderly and systematic manner.  It has been said that these plans could not have been made known beforehand to the Subordinate Commands for fear they should fall into the hands of spies.  That would have been a small misfortune compared to what actually befell.[1]

[Footnote 1:  In fairness to General Capello, the Second Army Commander, who had been highly and deservedly praised for the Bainsizza victory in August, and who was one of the generals removed from his command after Caporetto, it should be stated that on the latter occasion he was away from the Front on leave.]