and protected the Nebi Samwil flank, the securing of which in those days of bitter fighting was an important factor.  It was evident from what was happening on this front, not only where two divisions of infantry had to strain every nerve to hold on to what they had got but where the Yeomanry Mounted Division were battling against enormous odds in the worse country to the north-west, that the Turks were not going to allow us to get to the Nablus road without making a direct attack on the Jerusalem defences.  They outnumbered us, had a large preponderance in guns, were near their base, and enjoyed the advantage of prepared positions and a comparatively easy access to supplies and ammunition.  Everything was in their favour down to the very state of the weather.  But our army struggled on against all the big obstacles.  On the 23rd the 75th Division renewed their attack on El Jib, but although the men showed the dash which throughout characterised the Division, it had to be stopped.  The garrison of El Jib had been reinforced, and the enemy held the woods, wadi banks, and sangars in greater strength than before, while the artillery fire was extremely heavy.  Not only was the 75th Division tired with ceaseless fighting, but the losses they had sustained since they left the Plain of Ajalon had been substantial, and the 52nd Division took over from them that night to prepare for another effort on the following day.  The Scots were no more successful.  They made simultaneous attacks on the northern and southern ends of Nebi Samwil, and a brigade worked up from Beit Izza to a ridge north-west of El Jib.  Two magnificent attempts were made to get into the enemy’s positions, but they failed.  The officer casualties were heavy; some companies had no officers, and the troops were worn out by great exertions and privations in the bleak hills.  The two divisions had been fighting hard for over three weeks, they had marched long distances on hard food, which at the finish was not too plentiful, and the sudden violent change in the weather conditions made it desirable that the men should get to an issue of warmer clothing.  General Bulfin realised it would be risking heavy losses to ask his troops to make another immediate effort against a numerically stronger enemy in positions of his own choice, and he therefore applied to General Allenby that the XXth Corps—­the 60th Division was already at Latron attached to the XXIst Corps—­might take over the line.  The Commander-in-Chief that evening ordered the attack on the enemy’s positions to be discontinued until the arrival of fresh troops.  During the next day or two the enemy’s artillery was as active as hitherto, but the punishment he had received in his attacks made him pause, and there were only small half-hearted attempts to reach our line.  They were all beaten off by infantry fire, and the reliefs of the various brigades of the XXIst Corps were complete by November 28.  It had not been given to the XXIst Corps to obtain the distinction