one in divisional reserve, and the 74th Division attacking
on the left of the 60th likewise had a brigade in
reserve. The 74th, while waiting to advance,
came under considerable shell-fire from batteries on
the north of the wadi, and it was some time before
their fire could be silenced. As a rule the enemy
works were cut into rocky, rising ground and the trenches
were well enclosed in wire fixed to iron stanchions.
They were strongly made and there were possibilities
of prolonged opposition, but by the time the big assault
was launched the Turks knew they were being attacked
on both sides of Beersheba and they must have become
anxious about a line of retreat. General Shea
reported that the wire in front of him was cut before
noon, but General Girdwood was not certain that the
wire was sufficiently broken on the 74th Division’s
front, though he intimated to the Corps Commander
that he was ready to attack at the same time as the
60th. It still continued a windless day, and
the dust clouds prevented any observation of the wire
entanglements. General Girdwood turned this disadvantage
to account, and ordering his artillery to raise their
fire slightly so that it should fall just in front
of and about the trenches, put up what was in effect
a dust barrage, and under cover of it selected detachments
of his infantry advanced almost into the bursting
shell to cut passages through the wire with wire-cutters.
The dismounted yeomanry of the 231st and 230th Infantry
Brigades rushed through, and by half-past one the
74th Division had secured their objectives. The
179th and 181st Brigades of the 60th Division had won
their trenches almost an hour earlier, and about 5000
yards of works were in our hands south of the wadi
Saba. The enemy had 3000 yards of trenches north
of the wadi, and though these were threatened from
the south and west, it was not until five o’clock
that the 230th Brigade occupied them, the Turks clearing
out during the bombardment. During the day, on
the left of the 74th Division, the Imperial Camel Corps
Brigade and two battalions of the 53rd Division held
the ground to the north of the wadi Saba to a point
where the remainder of the 53rd Division watched for
the approach of any enemy force from the north, while
the 10th Division about Shellal protected the line
of communications east of the wadi Ghuzze, and the
Yeomanry Mounted Division was on the west side of
the wadi Ghuzze in G.H.Q. reserve. The XXth Corps’
losses were 7 officers killed and 42 wounded, 129
other ranks killed, 988 wounded and 5 missing, a light
total considering the nature of the works carried
during the day. It was obvious that the enemy
was taken completely by surprise by the direction
of the attack, and the rapidity with which we carried
his strongest points was overwhelming. The Turk
did not attempt anything in the nature of a counter-attack
by the Beersheba garrison, nor did he make any move
from Hareira against the 53rd Division. Had he
done so the 10th Division and the Yeomanry Mounted
Division would have seized the opportunity of falling
on him from Shellal, and the Turk chose the safer
course of allowing the Beersheba garrison to stand
unaided in its own defences. The XXth Corps’
captures included 25 officers, 394 other ranks, 6
guns, and numerous machine guns.