On the assumption that General Allenby—­after the two unsuccessful British attacks—­will attack only with a marked superiority of men and munitions, a passive defence on a thirty-five kilometre front with an exposed flank does not appear to offer any great chance of success.

The conditions on the Western Front (defensive zone, attack divisions) are only partially applicable here, since the mobility of the artillery and the correct tactical handling of the attack division are not assured.  The intended passive defensive will not be improved by the theatrical attack with one division suggested by General von Kress.

  On the contrary this attack would be without result, as
  it would be carried out too obliquely to the front, and would
  only mean a sacrifice of men and material.

The attack proposed by His Excellency for the envelopment of the enemy’s flank—­if carried out during the first half of October with four divisions plus the ’Asia Corps’—­will perhaps have no definite result, but will at all events result in this:  that the Gaza Front flanked by the sea will tie down considerable forces and defer the continuation of British operations in the wet season, during which, in the opinion of General von Kress, they cannot be carried on with any prospect of success.

The situation on the Sinai Front will then be clear.  Naturally it is possible that the position here may demand the inclusion of further effectives and the Yilderim operation consequently become impracticable.  This, however, will only prove that the determining factor of the decisive operation for Turkey during the winter of 1917-1918 lies in Palestine and not in Mesopotamia.  An offensive on the Sinai Front is therefore—­even with reduced forces and a limited objective—­the correct solution.

  PAPEN.

IV

Letter from General Kress von Kressenstein to Yilderim headquarters, dated September 29, 1917, on moral of Turkish troops.

A question which urgently needs regulating is that of deserters.  According to my experience their number will increase still more with the setting in of the bad weather and the deterioration of rations.

Civil administration and the gendarmerie fail entirely; they often have a secret understanding with the population and are open to bribery.

The cordon drawn by me is too weak to prevent desertion.  I am also too short of troops to have the necessary raids undertaken in the hinterland.  It is necessary that the hunt for deserters in the area between the front and the line Jerusalem-Ramleh-Jaffa be formally organised under energetic management, that one or two squadrons exclusively for this service be detailed, and that a definite reward be paid for bringing in each deserter.  But above all it is necessary that punishment should follow in consequence, and that the unfortunately very frequent amnesties of His Majesty the Sultan be discontinued, at least for some time.