to ward off attack.  The Irak undertaking could be carried through at the same time.  Judging from all former experiences I am firmly convinced as soon as it comes to a question of the expected attack on the Sinai Front, or even if the IVth Army only feels itself seriously threatened, further troops, munitions, and material will be withdrawn from the Army Group, and Turkey’s forces will be shattered.

  Then nothing decisive can be undertaken in either theatre
  of war.  The sacrifice of men, money, and material which
  Germany is offering at the present moment will be in vain.

The treatment of the question is rendered all the more difficult because I cannot rid myself of the impression that the decision of the Turkish Higher Command is based far less on military exigencies than on personal motives.  It is dictated with one eye on the mighty Jemal, who deprecates a definite decision, but yet on the other hand opposes the slightest diminution of the area of his command.

Consequently as the position now stands, I consider the Irak undertaking practicable only if it is given the necessary freedom for retirement through the removal of the danger on the Syrian Front.  The removal of this danger I regard as only possible through attack.  V. FALKENHAYN.

III

Here is another German estimate of the position created by our War Cabinet’s decision to take the offensive in Palestine, and in considering the view of the German Staff and the prospect of success any Turkish attack would have, it must be borne in mind that under the most favourable circumstances the enemy could not have been in position for taking an offensive before the end of October.  Von Falkenhayn wished to attack the British ’before the arrival of their reinforcements.’  Not only had our reinforcements arrived before the end of October, but they were all in position and the battle had commenced.  Beersheba was taken on October 31.  This appreciation was written by Major von Papen of Yilderim headquarters on August 28, 1917: 

Enver’s objections, the improbability of attaining a decisive result on the Sinai Front with two divisions plus the ‘Asia Corps’ and the difficulty of the Aleppo-Rayak transport question, hold good.

The execution of the offensive with stronger forces is desirable, but is not practicable, as, in consequence of the beginning of the rainy weather in the middle of November, the British offensive may be expected at the latest during the latter half of October; ours therefore should take place during the first part of that month.

  The transport question precludes the assembly of stronger
  forces by that date.

  Should the idea of an offensive be abandoned altogether
  on that account?