Should this not be the case, I would be ready to exchange two divisions from the Vth Army for the two infantry divisions of the VIth Army Corps, as the former are only suited for a war of position, and would have to be made mobile by the allotment of transport and equipment.

If these two infantry divisions were given up, the Vth Army would have only five infantry divisions of no great fighting value, a condition of things which is perhaps not very desirable.

  For the moment my decision is:  Defence of Syria by
  strengthening that front by one infantry division, and
  prosecution of the Yilderim scheme.

Should good prospects offer of beating the British decisively in Syria before they have been reinforced I will take up General von Falkenhayn’s proposal again, as far as it appears possible to carry it out, having in view the question of transport and rationing, which still has to be settled in some respects.—­Turkish Main Headquarters, ENVER.

II

Von Falkenhayn despatched the following telegram from Constantinople on August 25, 1917, to German General Headquarters: 

The possibility of a British attack in Syria has had to be taken into consideration from the beginning.  Its repercussion on the Irak undertaking was obvious.  On that account I had already settled in my conversations in Constantinople during May that, if the centre of gravity of operations were transferred to the Sinai Front, command should be given me there too.  The news now to hand—­reinforcement of the British troops in Egypt, taking over of command by Allenby, the demands of the British Press daily becoming louder—­makes the preparation of a British attack in Syria probable.

Jemal Pasha wishes to meet it with a defensive.  To that end he demands the divisions and war material which were being collected about Aleppo for Yilderim.  The natural result of granting this request will be that true safety will never be attained on the Sinai Front by a pure defensive, and that the Irak undertaking will certainly fritter away owing to want of driving power or to delays.

I had consequently proposed to the Turkish Higher Command to send two divisions and the ‘Asia’ Corps as quickly as possible to Southern Syria, so as to carry out a surprise attack on the British by means of an encircling movement before the arrival of their reinforcements.  Railways allow of the assembly of these forces (inclusive of heavy artillery, material and technical stores) in the neighbourhood of Beersheba by the end of October.  The disposable parts of the IVth Army (two to three divisions) would be added to it.

In a discussion between Enver, Jemal, and myself, Enver decided first of all to strengthen the IVth Army by the inclusion of one division from the Army Group.  This division would suffice