A strange Nemesis was preparing.  The programme of German expansion—­natural enough in itself, but engineered by Prussia during all this long period with that kind of blind haughtiness and overbearing assurance which indeed is a “tempting of Providence”—­had so far not concerned itself much about Muscovite policy; but now there arose a sudden fear of danger in that quarter.  Hitherto the main German “objective” had undoubtedly been England and France, Belgium and Holland—­the westward movement towards the Atlantic and the great world.  But now all unexpectedly, or at any rate with dramatic swiftness, Russia appeared on the scenes, and there was a volte face towards the East.  The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 broke out.  Whatever simmerings of hostility there may have been between Germany and Russia before, the relations of the two now became seriously strained.  The Balkan League, formed under Russian influence, was nominally directed against Turkey; but it was also a threat to Austria.  It provided a powerful backing to the Servian agitation, it was a step towards the dissolution of Austria, and it decisively closed the door on Germany’s ambition to reach Salonika and to obtain a direct connection with the Baghdad Railway.  Germany and Austria all at once found themselves isolated in the midst of Europe, with Russia, Servia, France, and England hostile on every side.  It was indeed a tragic situation, and all the more so when viewed as the sorry outcome and culmination of a hundred years of Prussian diplomacy and statecraft.

Why under these circumstances Austria (with Germany of course behind her) should have dictated most insulting terms to Servia, and then refused to accept Servia’s most humble apology, is difficult to understand.  The only natural explanation is that the Germanic Powers on the whole thought it best, even as matters stood, to precipitate war; that notwithstanding all the complications, they thought that the long-prepared-for hour had come.  The German White Book puts the matter as a mere necessity of self-defence.  “Had the Servians been allowed, with the help of Russia and France, to endanger the integrity of the neighbouring Monarchy much longer, the consequence must have been the gradual disruption of Austria and the subjection of the whole Slav world to the Russian sceptre, with the result that the position of the German race in Central Europe would have become untenable”; but it is obvious that this plea is itself untenable, since it makes a quite distant and problematic danger the excuse for a sudden and insulting blow—­for a blow, in fact, almost certain to precipitate the danger!  How the matter was decided in Berlin we cannot at present tell, or what the motives exactly were.  It seems rather probable that the Kaiser threw his weight on the side of peace.  The German Executive at any rate saw that the great war they had so long contemplated and so long prepared for was close upon them—­only