However we distribute the indictment and the charges among the various parties concerned, whether we accuse mainly the sway of Prussian Militarism or the rise of German Commercialism, or the long tradition and growth of a Welt-politik philosophy, or the general political ignorance which gave to these influences such rash and uncritical acceptance; or whether we accuse the somewhat difficult and variable personal equation of the Kaiser himself—­the fact still remains that for years and years this war has been by the German Government most deliberately and systematically prepared for.  The fact remains that Britain—­though for a long period she had foreseen danger and had on the naval side slowly braced herself to meet it—­was on the military side caught at the last moment unprepared; that France was so little intending war that a large portion of the nation was actually still protesting against an increase in the size of the standing army; and that Russia—­whatever plans she may have had, or not had, in mind—­was confessedly at the same period two years or so behind in the organization and completion of her military establishment.

Whether right or wrong, it can hardly be denied that the moment of the precipitation of war was chosen and insisted on by Germany.  After Austria’s monstrous and insulting dictation to Servia (23rd July), and Servia’s incredibly humble apology (25th), Austria was still not allowed to accept the latter, and the conference proposed (26th July) by Sir E. Grey—­though accepted by France, Russia, and Italy—­was refused by Germany (27th).  On the 28th Austria declared war on Servia.  It was perfectly clear to every one that Russia—­after what had happened before in 1908-9, with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina—­could not possibly allow this insult to Servia to pass.  Germany, therefore, by this move forced Russia’s hand; and at a moment when Russia was known or supposed to be comparatively unprepared.[11] France had been involved in some military scandals and was still debating as to the two years’ instead of three years’ period for her normal military service.  The German Ambassador at Vienna had openly said that France was not in a condition for facing a war.  England was currently supposed in Germany to be seriously hampered by domestic troubles at home—­chiefly of course among the Irish, but also amongst the Suffragettes(!) and by widespread disaffection in India.  It was thought, therefore, that England would certainly remain neutral—­and I think we may fairly say that the extent to which Germany counted on this expected neutrality is evidenced by her disappointment and public rage when she found that she was mistaken.

Germany’s initiative in the matter is further evidenced by her instant readiness to attack.  She was in Luxemburg within a few hours of the declaration of war with Russia; and it was clearly her intention to “rush” Paris and then turn back upon Russia.