In the facility with which the demands of Greece were accepted (and in spite of everything they were accepted even after the fall of Venezelos) there was not only a sympathy for Greece, but, above all, the certainty that a large Greek army at Smyrna would serve principally towards the security of those countries which have and wished to consolidate great interests in Asia Minor, as long as the Turks of Anatolia were thinking specially about Smyrna and could not use her forces elsewhere.  For the same motive, in the last few years, all the blame is attributed to the Turks.  If they have erred much, the errors, even the minor ones, have been transformed into crimes.  The atrocities of the Turks have been described, illustrated, exaggerated; all the other atrocities, often no less serious, have been forgotten or ignored.

The idea of a Hellenic Empire which dominates all the coast of the Aegean in Europe and Asia encounters one fundamental difficulty.  To dominate the coast it is necessary to have the certainty of a large hinterland.  The Romans in order to dominate Dalmatia were obliged to go as far as the Danube.  Alexander the Great, to have a Greek Empire, had, above all, to provide for land dominion.  Commercial colonies or penetration in isolation are certainly possible, but vast political organizations are not possible.  It is not sufficient to have territory; it is necessary to organize it and regulate the life.  Mankind does not nourish itself on what it eats, and even less on what it digests, but on what it assimilates.

Historians of the future will be profoundly surprised to learn that in the name of the principle of nationality the vilayet of Adrianople, which contains the city dearest to the heart of Islam after Mecca, was given to the Greeks.  According to the very data supplied by Venezelos there were 500,000 Turks, 365,000 Greeks, and 107,000 Bulgarians; in truth the Turks are in much greater superiority.

The Grand Vizier of Turkey, in April, 1920, presented a note to the ambassadors of the Entente to revindicate the rights on certain vilayets of the Turkish Empire.  According to this note, in Western Thrace there were 522,574 inhabitants, of which 362,445 were Mussulmans.  In the vilayet of Adrianople, out of 631,000 inhabitants, 360,417 were Mussulmans.  The population of the vilayet of Smyrna is 1,819,616 inhabitants, of which 1,437,983 are Mussulmans.  Perhaps these statistics are biased, but the statistics presented by the opposing party were even more fantastic.

After having had so many territorial concessions, Greece—­who during the War had enriched herself by commerce—­is obliged, even after the return of Constantine, who did not know how to resist the pressure, to undertake most risky undertakings in Asia Minor, and has no way of saving herself except by an agreement with Turkey.  In the illusion of conquering the Turkish resistance, she is now obliged to maintain an army twice as big as that of the British