Great Britain and Italy are the only two countries which have largely demobilized; Great Britain in the much greater measure.  It is calculated that Great Britain has under arms 201,000 men, of which 15,030 are officers.  In this number, however, are not included 75,896 men in India and the personnel of the Air Force.

In Italy, on July 31, 1921, there were under arms 351,076 soldiers and 18,138 officers, in all 369,214, of which, however, 56,529 were carabineers carrying out duties almost exclusively of public order.

Under the pressure and as a result of the example of the States which have come through the War, those States which did not take part have also largely augmented their armies.

So, whilst the conquered have ceased every preoccupation, the neutrals of the War have developed their armaments, and the conquerors have developed theirs beyond measure.

No one can say what may be the position of Bolshevik Russia; probably she has not much less than a million of men under arms, also because in a communist regime the vagabonds and the violent find the easiest occupation in the army.

The conquerors, having disarmed the conquered, have imposed their economic conditions, their absurd moralities and territorial humiliations, as those imposed on Bulgaria, Turkey and Hungary, conditions which are sufficiently difficult to be maintained.  And as the ferment of hate develops, the conquerors do not disarm.  Above all, the little States do not disarm, who have wanted too much, have obtained too much, and now do not know how to maintain what they have.  In many countries for certain social reasons war has become an industry; they live by the state of war.  What would they do without a state of war?

In general, then, Europe has considerably more men under arms than in 1913.  Not only has it not disarmed, as the Entente always declared would be the consequence of the victory of the principles of democracy, but the victors are always leaning toward further armament.  The more difficult it becomes to maintain the conditions of the peace, because of their severity and their absurdity, the more necessary it is to maintain armies.  The conquered have not armies; the conquerors are, or, perhaps, up to a short time ago, were sure that the big armies would serve to enforce the payment of the indemnities.  Now, in fact, they would not serve for anything else.

At the Conference of London, after a long discussion in February, 1920, the economic manifesto was drawn up which warned Europe of the perils of the economic situation.  Lloyd George and myself were easily agreed in denouncing it as the gravest danger, as the principal cause of high prices and of economic disorder, both as to the maintenance of large armies and in the continuation of the state of war.

A Europe divided distinctly into two parts cannot be pacific even after the conquered have yielded up their arms.  The conquerors are bound to arm themselves because of their own inquietude, from the conviction that the only salvation is in force, which allows, if not a true peace, at least an armed peace; if not the development of production and exchange, at least the possibility of cutting off from the markets the very fountains of riches.