Russia has always had a latent force of development; there is within her a vis inertiae equivalent to a mysterious energy of expansion.  Her birth-rate is higher than that of any other European country; she does not progress, she increases.  Her weight acts as a menace to neighbouring countries, and as, by a mysterious historic law the primitive migrations of peoples and the ancient invasions mostly originated from the territories now occupied by Russia, the latter has succeeded in amalgamating widely different peoples and in creating unity where no affinity appeared possible.

At any rate, although suffering from an excessively centralized government and a form of constitution which did not allow the development of popular energies nor a sufficient education of the people, Russia was perhaps, half a century before the War, the European country which, considering the difficulties in her path, had accomplished most progress.

European Russia, with her yearly excess of from one million and a half to two million births over deaths, with the development of her industries and the formation of important commercial centres, progressed very rapidly and was about to become the pivot of European politics.

When it will be possible to examine carefully the diplomatic documents of the War, and time will allow us to judge them calmly, it will be seen that Russia’s attitude was the real and underlying cause of the world-conflict.  She alone promoted and kept alive the agitations in Serbia and of the Slavs in Austria; she alone in Germany’s eyes represented the peril of the future.  Germany has never believed in a French danger.  She knew very well that France, single handed, could never have withstood Germany, numerically so much her superior.  Russia was the only danger that Germany saw, and the continual increase of the Russian army was her gravest preoccupation.  Before the War, when Italy was Germany’s ally, the leading German statesmen with whom I had occasion to discuss the situation did nothing but allude to the Russian peril.  It was known (and subsequent facts have amply proved it) that the Tsar was absolutely devoid of will power, that he was led and carried away by conflicting currents, and that his advisers were for the most part favourable to the War.  After the Japanese defeat the militarist party felt keenly the need for just such a great military revival and a brilliant revanche in Europe.

Possessing an enormous wealth of raw materials and an immense territory, Russia represented Europe’s great resource, her support for the future.

If the three great empires had attained enviable prosperity and development in 1914, when the War burst, the three great western democracies, Great Britain, France and Italy, had likewise progressed immensely.