At that time the autocratic form of government still prevailed in Russia, and the Allies still considered themselves bound to Russia’s aspirations; moreover there existed, in regard to Italy, the obligations established by the Pact of London.  That is why in the statements of the Entente Powers of Europe the restoration of Montenegro is regarded as an obligation; mention is made of the necessity of driving the Turks out of Europe in order to enable Russia to seize Constantinople; and as to Poland, there are only vague allusions, namely, the reference made to the Tsar’s intentions as outlined in his proclamation.

The Entente has won the War, but Russia has collapsed under the strain.  Had victory been achieved without the fall of Russia, the latter would have installed herself as the predominating Power in the Mediterranean.  On the other hand, to unite Dalmatia to Italy, while separating her from Italy, according to the pact of London, by assigning the territory of Fiume to Croatia, would have meant setting all the forces of Slav irredentism against Italy.

These considerations are of no practical value inasmuch as events have taken another course.  Nobody can say what would have happened if the Carthagenians had conquered the Romans or if victory had remained with Mithridates.  Hypotheses are of but slight interest when truth follows another direction.  Nevertheless we cannot but repeat that it was a great fortune for Europe that victory was not decided by Russia, and that the decisive factor proved the United States.

It is beyond all possible doubt that without the intervention of the United States of America the War could not have been won by the Entente.  Although the admission may prove humiliating to the European point of view, it is a fact which cannot be attenuated or disguised.  The United States threw into the balance the weight of its enormous economic and technical resources, besides its enormous resources in men.  Although its dead only amount to fifty thousand, the United States built up such a formidable human reserve as to deprive Germany of all hopes of victory.  The announcement of America’s entry in the War immediately crushed all Germany’s power of resistance.  Germany felt that the struggle was no longer limited to Europe, and that every effort was vain.

The United States, besides giving to the War enormous quantities of arms and money, had practically inexhaustible reserves of men to place in the field against an enemy already exhausted and famine-stricken.

War and battles are two very different things.  Battles constitute an essentially military fact, while war is an essentially political fact.  That explains why great leaders in war have always been first and foremost great political leaders, namely, men accustomed to manage other men and able to utilize them for their purposes.  Alexander, Julius Caesar, Napoleon, the three greatest military leaders produced by Aryan