In France the very authors of the Treaty of Versailles recognize that it is weakened by a series of successive attenuations.  Tardieu has asserted that the Treaty of Versailles tends to be abandoned on all sides:  “Cette faillite a des causes allemandes, des causes allies, des causes francaises” (p. 489).  The United States has asked itself, after the trouble that has followed the treaty, if wisdom did not lie in the old time isolation, in Washington’s testament, in the Monroe doctrine:  Keep off.  But in America they have not understood, says Tardieu, that to assist Europe the same solidarity was necessary that existed during the War (p. 493).

Great Britain, according to Tardieu, tends now also to stand aside.  The English are inclined to say, “N’en parlons plus” (p. 493).  No Frenchman will accept with calm the manner in which Lloyd George has conceived the execution of the peace treaty.  The campaign for the revision of the treaties sprang up in lower spheres and from popular associations and workmen’s groups, has surprised and saddened the French spirit (p. 495).  In the new developments “etait-ce une autre Angleterre, etait-ce un autre Lloyd George?” (p. 496).  Even in France herself Tardieu recognizes sadly the language has altered:  “les gouvernements francais, qui se sont succede au pouvoir depuis le 10 janvier, 1920,” that is, after the fall of Clemenceau, accused in turn by Poincare of being weak and feeble in asserting his demands, “ont compromis les droits que leur predecesseur avait fait reconnaitre a la France” (p. 503).

Taking into consideration Germany’s financial downfall, which threatens to upset not only all the indemnity schemes but the entire economy of continental Europe, the state of mind which is prevalent is not much different from that which Tardieu indicates.

It is already more than a year ago since I left the direction of the Italian Government, and the French Press no longer accused me of being in perfect agreement with Lloyd George, yet Poincare wrote on August 1, 1920: 

L’autre jour M. Asquith declarait au parlement britannique:  “Quelque forme de langage qu’on emploie, la conference de Spa a bien ete, en fait, une conference pour la revision des conditions du traite.”  “Chut!” a repondu M. Lloyd George:  “c’est la une declaration tres grave par l’effet qu’elle peut produire en France.  Je ne puis la laisser passer sans la contredire.”  Contradiction de pure forme, faite pour courtoisie vis-a-vis de nous, mais qui malheureusement ne change rien au fond des choses.  Chaque fois que le Conseil Supreme s’est reuni, il a laisse sur la table des deliberations quelques morceaux epars du traite.

No kind of high-handedness, no combined effort, will ever be able to keep afloat absurdities like the dream of the vast indemnity, the Polish programme, the hope of annexing the Saar, etc.  As things go there is almost more danger for the victors than for the vanquished.  He who has lost all has nothing to lose.  It is rather the victorious nations who risk all in this disorganized Europe of ours.  The conquerors arm themselves in the ratio by which the vanquished disarm, and the worse the situation of our old enemies becomes, so much the worse become the exchanges and the credits of the victorious continental countries.