Italy saved the destinies of France for the first time by declaring her neutrality on August 2, 1914, and letting the certainty of it be known from July 30, as the diplomatic documents have shown.

It was that sudden and unexpected declaration of neutrality which rendered it possible for France to concentrate all her forces in the north and to win the battle of the Marne.  Italy for a second time saved the destinies of the Entente by entering into the War (too precipitately and unprepared), in May, 1915, thus preventing the Austrian army, which was formidable for its technical organization and for its valour, from obtaining the advantages it expected.

Why did Italy go to war?

The diplomatic documents, which are not all documents of political wisdom, demonstrate the anxiety of the Italian Government to realize its Adriatic programme and to gain secure frontiers against Austria-Hungary and its successors.  But this was not the cause of the War; it was rather a means of explaining to the people the necessity for the War.  Italy had been for nearly thirty-four years ally of Austria-Hungary, and the aspirations of Italy’s Adriatic policy had never disturbed the relations between the two countries.  The real cause of Italy’s war was a sentimental movement, a form of extraordinary agitation of the spirits, brought about by the invasion of Belgium and the danger of France.  The intellectual movement especially, the world of culture, partook largely in fomenting the state of exaltation which determined the War.

During the progress of the War, which was long and bitter, Italy passed through some terrible hours.  Her privations during the War, and immediately after, surpassed all expectations.  Italy found herself face to face with an enemy who enjoyed a superior geographical situation, a numerical superiority, as well as a superiority in artillery.  After the downfall of Russia she had to support a terrible campaign.  Even in 1917, after the military disaster, when allied troops came to Italy, she sent abroad more men than there came allied troops to her aid.  According to some statistics which I had compiled, and which I communicated to the Allies, Italy was shown, in relation to her demographic structure, to have more men in the front line than any other country.  The economic sufferings were, and are, greater than those endured by others.  France is only in part a Mediterranean country, while Italy is entirely so.  During the War the action of the submarines rendered the victualling of Italy a very difficult matter.  Many provinces, for months on end, had to content themselves with the most wretched kind of food.  Taking population and wealth into proportion, if the United States had made the effort of Italy they would have had to arm sixteen millions of men, to have lost a million and a half to two million soldiers, and to have spent at least four hundred milliards.  In order to work up popular enthusiasm (and it was perhaps necessary), the importance of the country’s Adriatic claims was exaggerated.  Thus many Italians believe even to-day in good faith that the War may be considered as lost if some of these aspirations have not been realized or will not be realized.