the mainland and the island.  It was too late for the Inflexible to beat back now.  But the rest of Carleton’s flotilla turned in to the attack.  Arnold’s flanks rested on the island and the mainland.  His rear could be approached only by beating back against a bad wind all the way round the outside of Valcour Island; and, even if this manoeuvre could have been performed, the British attack on his rear from the north could have been made only in a piecemeal way, because the channel was there at its narrowest, with a bad obstruction in the middle.  So, for every reason, a frontal attack from the south was the one way of closing with him.  The fight was furious while it lasted and seemingly decisive when it ended.  Arnold’s best vessel, the Royal Savage, which he had taken at St Johns the year before, was driven ashore and captured.  The others were so severely mauled that when the victorious British anchored their superior force in line across Arnold’s front there seemed to be no chance for him to escape the following day.  But that night he performed an even more daring and wonderful feat than Bouchette had performed the year before when paddling Carleton through the American lines among the islands opposite Sorel.  Using muffled sweeps, with consummate skill he slipped all his remaining vessels between the mainland and the nearest British gunboat, and was well on his way to Crown Point before his escape had been discovered.  Next day Carleton chased south.  The day after he destroyed the whole of the enemy’s miniature sea-power as a fighting force.  But the only three serviceable vessels got away; while Arnold burnt everything else likely to fall into British hands.  So Carleton had no more than his own reduced flotilla to depend on when he occupied Crown Point.

A vexed question, destined to form part of a momentous issue, now arose.  Should Ticonderoga be attacked at once or not?  It commanded the only feasible line of march from Montreal to New York; and no force from Canada could therefore attack the new republic effectively without taking it first.  But the season was late.  The fort was strong, well gunned, and well manned.  Carleton’s reconnaissance convinced him that he could have little chance of reducing it quickly, if at all, with the means at hand, especially as the Americans had supplies close by at Lake George, while he was now a hundred miles south of his base.  A winter siege was impossible.  Sufficient supplies could never be brought through the dense, snow-encumbered bush, all the way from Canada, even if the long and harassing line of communications had not been everywhere open to American attack.  Moreover, Carleton’s army was in no way prepared for a midwinter campaign, even if it could have been supplied with food and warlike stores.  So he very sensibly turned his back on Lake Champlain until the following year.