SOURCE: “Rights and Utilitarianism,” in New Essays on John Stuart Mill and Utilitarianism, edited by Wesley E. Cooper, Kai Nielson, and Steven C. Patten, Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1979, pp. 137-60.

In the following essay, Narveson explores the conflict between justice and utility in the thought of J. S. Mill.

I. Introduction

Few questions about utilitarianism have been more vexed than that of its relation to rights (and its associated notion, justice). It is commonplace to hold that there are nonutilitarian rights, rights not founded on considerations of utility. And it is even thought that the very notion of rights is inherently incapable of being significantly employed within the utilitarian framework. In the present paper, I wish to consider both of these matters. I propose to give reasons—mostly not really new—for rejecting the stronger, conceptual claim; and on the former, substantial question, I want to...